The Islamic State's West Africa Province is officially termed "Wilāyat Garb Ifrīqīyā" (Arabic: ولاية غرب أفريقيا), meaning "West African Province".[2] It is known by a variety of other names and abbreviations such as "ISWAP", "IS-WA", and "ISIS-WA".[3] After ISWAP formally absorbed IS-GS, it was also differentiated by experts into two branches, namely "ISWAP-Lake Chad" and "ISWAP-Greater Sahara".[4]
History
ISWAP's origins date back to the emergence of Boko Haram, a Salafi jihadist movement centred in Borno State in northeastern Nigeria. The movement launched an insurgency against the Nigerian government following an unsuccessful uprising in 2009, aiming at establishing an Islamic state in northern Nigeria,[5] and neighbouring regions of Cameroon, Chad and Niger. Its de facto leader Abubakar Shekau attempted to increase his international standing among Islamists by allying with the prominent Islamic State (IS) in March 2015. Boko Haram thus became the "Islamic State's West Africa Province" (ISWAP).[6][7][3]
When the insurgents were subsequently defeated and lost almost all of their lands during the 2015 West African offensive by the Multinational Joint Task Force (MJTF), discontent grew among the rebels.[6][7][8] Despite orders by the ISIL's central command to stop using women and children as suicide bombers as well as refrain from mass killings of civilians, Shekau refused to change his tactics.[9] Researcher Aymenn Jawad Al-Tamimi summarized that the Boko Haram leader proved to be "too extreme even by the Islamic State's standards".[10] Shekau had always refused to fully submit to ISIL's central command, and the latter consequently removed him as leader of ISWAP in August 2016. Shekau responded by breaking with ISIL's central command, but many of the rebels stayed loyal to IS. As a result, the rebel movement split into a Shekau-loyal faction ("Jama'at Ahl al-sunna li-l-Da'wa wa-l-Jihad", generally known as "Boko Haram"), and a pro-IS faction led by Abu Musab al-Barnawi (which continued to call itself "Islamic State's West Africa Province"). These two groups have since clashed with each other, though they possibly occasionally cooperated against the local governments.[6][7][8] In addition, Shekau never officially renounced his pledge of allegiance to IS as a whole; his forces are thus occasionally regarded as "second branch of ISWAP". Overall, the relation of Shekau with IS remained confused and ambiguous.[11]
In the next years, Barnawi's ISWAP and Shekau's Boko Haram both reconsolidated, though ISWAP grew into the more powerful group. Whereas Shekau had about 1,000 to 2,000 fighters under his command by 2019, the Islamic State loyalists counted up to 5,000 troops.[12] It also changed its tactics, and attempted to win support by local civilians unlike Boko Haram which was known for its extensive indiscriminate violence. ISWAP begun to build up basic government services and focused its efforts on attacking Christian targets instead of Muslim ones. However, the group also continued to attack humanitarian personnel and select Muslim communities.[3] In the course of the Chad Basin campaign (2018–2020), ISWAP had extensive territorial gains before losing many to counter-offensives by the local security forces. At the same time, it experienced a violent internal dispute which resulted in the deposition of Abu Musab al-Barnawi and the execution of several commanders.[13][14] In the course of 2020, the Nigerian Armed Forces repeatedly attempted to capture the Timbuktu Triangle[a] from ISWAP, but suffered heavy losses and made no progress.[16]
In April 2021, ISWAP overran a Nigerian Army base around Mainok, capturing armoured fighting vehicles including main battle tanks, as well as other military equipment.[17] In the next month, ISWAP attacked and overran Boko Haram's bases in the Sambisa Forest and Abubakar Shekau killed himself.[18] As a result, many Boko Haram fighters defected to ISWAP, and the group secured a chain of strongholds from Nigeria to Mali to southern Libya.[19][20] Despite this major victory, ISWAP was forced to deal with Boko Haram loyalists who continued to oppose the Islamic State.[21] In August 2021, Abu Musab al-Barnawi was reportedly killed, either in battle with the Nigerian Army or during inter-ISWAP clashes.[22][23] The accuracy of this claim was questioned by Humangle Media researchers who gathered "multiple sources" suggesting that al-Barnawi had disappeared due to being promoted.[24] Later that month, ISWAP suffered a defeat when attacking Diffa,[25] but successfully raided Rann, destroying the local barracks before retreating with loot.[26] In October and November, there were further leadership changes in ISWAP, as senior commanders were killed by security forces, with Sani Shuwaram becoming the new leading commander.[27] In the Battles of Toumbun Allura Kurnawa and Toumbun Gini from 30 December to 7 January, ISWAP suffered a defeat at the hands of Boko Haram loyalists.[28]
By January 2022, ISWAP began to increase its presence in Nigeria's Borno State, occupying villages and setting up markets. On 24 January 2022, the small town of Gudumbali was captured, whereupon the insurgents declared it the province's new capital and drove away the local chieftains. Gudumbali is of strategic as well as symbolic importance, as it is placed at a well defendable position and was a major Boko Haram stronghold during the latter group's peak in power. However, Nigerian troops immediately counter-attacked this time, retaking the settlement, destroying the local ISWAP headquarters, and a nearby night market associated with the group.[29][30] By this point, researchers Rueben Dass and Jasminder Singh argued that ISWAP had become one of IS' most important strongholds.[31] In March, IS central command recognized its Greater Sahara branch as an autonomous province, called the "Sahel Province".[32] Regardless, ISWAP maintained influence over IS forces in Mali, Burkina Faso, and Niger.[24]
In the following months, however, Nigeria continued its attacks on ISWAP's leadership, killing more top commanders.[33] In June 2022, the Nigerian National Security Council declared that ISWAP was probably responsible for the Owo church attack.[34] As of October 2022, ISWAP had absorbed most of the former Boko Haram groups;[24][35] even one of Shekau's biological sons, known as Abul Musanna, had joined ISWAP as a commander.[36] However, some Boko Haram factions continued their resistance,[24][35] joined by Boko Haram defectors to ISWAP who had rebelled and rejoined their comrades. These splinter groups generally avoided fighting ISWAP directly, forcing the IS militants to expend considerable efforts to prevent defections and hunt for Boko Haram loyalists.[37] Despite these difficulties, ISWAP had also expanded its operations into central, northwestern, and southwestern Nigeria.[24][36] In the west, it began to compete with a reemerged Ansaru,[24] while organizing anti-government ambushes, terrorist attacks, and assassinations.[36] In December, the group pledged allegiance to the new IS caliph, Abu al-Hussein al-Husseini al-Qurashi.[38]
From March to June 2023, ISWAP greatly increased the number of small-scale raids in Cameroon's Far North Region, targeting Gassama, Amchide, Fotokol, and Mora among other locations. According to researcher Jacob Zenn, these attacks appeared to be mostly operations to gather loot and supplies as well as spread terror among civilians who refused to pay taxes to IS. The repeated raids caused "severe economic disruption" in northern Cameroon.[39]
Organization
Areas under control of Boko Haram and ISWAP in 2022
ISWAP's leadership is subordinate to IS's core group headed by its caliph. Initially, ISWAP was headed by a single commander, termed the wali (governor). The group's first overall wali was Abubakar Shekau who was succeeded by Abu Musab al-Barnawi in 2016. The latter was replaced by Ba Idrisa in March 2019 who was in turn purged and executed in 2020.[40][41] He was replaced by Ba Lawan.[41] In general, the shura, a consultative assembly,[42] holds great power within the group. This has led researcher Jacob Zenn to argue that the shura gives the group an element of "democracy". The shura's influence has allowed ISWAP to expand its popular support, yet has also made it more prone to leadership struggles.[43] Appointments to leadership positions such as the shura or the governorships are discussed internally and by ISIL's core group; IS's core group also has to approve new appointments.[42] In general, journalist Murtala Abdullahi argued that ISWAP mirrors the tendence of the IS core group to release little information on its leaders to the public, making even top commanders like Abu Musab al-Barnawi "elusive" figures.[44]
In May 2021, the shura was temporarily dissolved and Abu Musab al-Barnawi was appointed "caretaker" leader of ISWAP.[45][46] By July 2021, the shura had been restored,[42] and ISWAP's internal system had been reformed.[42][47] The regional central command now consists of the Amirul Jaish (military leader) and the shura. There is no longer an overall wali, and the shura's head instead serves as leader of ISWAP's governorates, while the Amirul Jaish acts as chief military commander. "Sa'ad" served as new Amirul Jaish, while Abu Musab al-Barnawi became head of the shura.[42] However, non-IS sources still claim that a position referred to as the overall "wali" or "leader of ISWAP" continues to exist.[47][27][48] This position was reportedly filled by ex-chief wali Ba Lawan (also "Abba Gana")[47][48] before passing to Abu-Dawud (also "Aba Ibrahim"), Abu Musab al-Barnawi, Malam Bako, Sani Shuwaram, Bako Gorgore, and Abu Ibrahim in quick succession in late 2021 and early 2022.[27][33] In course of 2022, ISWAP continued its reorganization efforts. The group's sub-units (or governorates) were granted a considerable level of autonomy, allowing them to operate as they saw fit and to separately pledge allegiance to the new IS caliph, Abu al-Hussein al-Husseini al-Qurashi.[38]
In March 2019,[40] IS's core group began to portray ISWAP as being responsible for all operations by pro-IS groups in West Africa. Accordingly, the Islamic State in the Greater Sahara (IS-GS) was formally put under ISWAP's command. ISWAP and IS-GS maintain logistical connections, but the former's actual influence on the latter is limited.[3][40] IS-GS was later separated from ISWAP, becoming its own province. Regardless, ISWAP and IS-GS continued to cooperate through the al-Furqan Office in the General Directorate of Provinces. The al-Furqan Office is located in IS-GS territory, but headed by ranking ISWAP commander Abu Bakr ibn Muhammad ibn Ali al-Mainuki (alias "Abubakar Mainok").[49]
In general, ISWAP is known to maintain substantial contacts with IS's core group,[42][50][51] although the exact extent of ties is debated among researchers.[3] ISWAP aligns ideologically with IS, and has also adopted many of its technologies and tactics. ISWAP uses suicide vehicle-borne improvised explosive devices[50] and drones typical for IS. Researchers consider these as proof of support and advice by IS members from Syria and Iraq.[50][51] IS's core group has probably provided ISWAP with not just technical, but also financial aid.[3][4]
Note: The office of overall wali appeared to have been abolished by 2021,[42] but outside sources continue to claim that certain individuals are the "leader" or "wali" of ISWAP.[48][27] Post-2021 leaders:
Malam Bako (acting, from September 2021) – also served as ISWAP defense minister;[54] allegedly killed in October 2021[55]
Head of the Shura
Abu Musab al-Barnawi[42] (2021)[42] – also acted as commander of Sambisa Forest from May 2021;[56] either killed in August 2021[22] or promoted to another position[24]
Malam Bako (August–October 2021); allegedly killed in October 2021[55]
Bako Gorgore (until 2021)[60] – killed in the battle of Sambisa Forest (May 2021)[60]
Wali of Sambisa Forest
Vacant as of mid-2021
Wali of Lake Chad
Baba Kaka (?–2020) – initially a commander in the Timbuktu area; eventually executed on charges of corruption, misgovernment, insubordination, and others after Ba Lawan's rise to ISWAP leader[59]
Falloja (until 2020) – expert in building VBIEDs; executed by Lake Chad governor Baba Kaka on charges of dealing drugs[59]
Head of the al-Furqan Office in the General Directorate of Provinces
Note: The al-Furqan Office serves as a coordination center for several IS branches, including ISWAP, IS-GS, and IS-Central. It is headquartered in IS-GS territory.
Abu Bakr ibn Muhammad ibn Ali al-Mainuki "Abubakar Mainok" (by 2023)[49]
Administration
In contrast to Boko Haram which mostly raided and enslaved civilians, ISWAP is known for setting up an administration in the territories where it is present.[3][60] By 2022, International Crisis Group researchers estimated that 800,000 to over 3 million civilians lived under ISWAP rule.[63] As IS maintains to be a state despite having lost its territory in the Middle East, ISWAP's ability to run a basic government is ideologically important for all of IS.[2] Despite not fully controlling the areas where it is present,[64] ISWAP maintains more control over large swaths of the countryside than the Nigerian government[65] and had created four governorates by 2021.[60] These governorates, centered at Lake Chad, Sambisa Forest, Timbuktu,[a] and Tumbuma, are each headed by a wali and have their own governing structures. Each governorate has its own military commanders, and sends at least two representatives to ISWAP's shura.[42] By early 2022, ISWAP acknowledged five sub-divisions or governorates, namely Lake Chad, Sambisa, Al Farouq (covering Timbuktu-Alagarno), Kerenoa (close to Lake Chad), and Banki (central Borno). Another sub-division or "cell", "Central Nigeria", became active in the following months, though this one appeared to solely operate as a guerrilla force instead of trying to capture territory. By late 2022, ISWAP's sub-units enjoyed a high level of autonomy.[38]
In addition to funding delivered by IS-Central and supportive international businessmen,[66] ISWAP collects taxes on agriculture, fishing, and trade in its territories.[12][3][67] In return, it offers protection as well as some "limited services",[65] including law enforcement.[3] The group appoints its own police chiefs, and its police also enforces the hisbah.[59] In ISWAP-held areas, the sharia law is enforced, including severe punishments such as the amputation of hands of thieves and the execution of adulterers. The sharia courts also offer to settle disputes over cattle rustling and various other crimes, winning some acceptance among the rural population. ISWAP also punishes its own fighters who commit unauthorized abuses toward civilians.[68]
The group makes considerable efforts to win local grassroots support,[19] and has employed a "hearts and minds" policy toward the local communities.[20] It encourages locals to live in de facto rebel-held communities.[65] Among its taxes, ISWAP also collects the zakat, a traditional Muslim tax and form of almsgiving which is used to provide for the poor. ISWAP's zakat has been featured in propaganda distributed by IS's newspaper, al-Naba.[2] ISWAP's "Zakat Office" is known to operate fairly systematically and effectively, raising substantial funds to support both ISWAP as well as local civilians. Experts Tricia Bacon and Jason Warner have described ISWAP's taxation system as being locally less corrupt and more fair than that of the Nigerian state; some local traders argue that ISWAP creates a better environment for trade in rice, fish, and dried pepper.[69] However, ISWAP militants are also known to kill those who refuse to pay taxes.[67] The group also provides various health services, builds public toilets and boreholes, and has implemented its own education system[24] based on Jihadist literature.[36] At the same time, ISWAP is known for targeting agencies providing humanitarian aid, thereby depriving locals of basic necessities in government-held areas.[65][3] It has also massacred civilians who collaborate with the local governments or disobey ISWAP orders, as well as persecuted the Christian minority in its territory.[70]
In 2022, Nigeria announced its intention to redesign its currency in an effort to combat corruption and the financing of terrorism. ISWAP responded by declaring that from then on, people should pay their taxes to the group in CFA franc.[67]
MT-LB which had been captured and used by ISWAP before its destruction in March 2015
ISWAP's strength has fluctuated over the years, and estimates accordingly vary. In 2017, researchers put its strength at around 5,000 militants.[71] By the next year, it was believed to have shrunk to circa 3,000.[72] The group experienced a surge and regained much power in 2019, resulting in researchers estimating that it had grown to 5,000 or up to 18,000 fighters.[12][73] By 2020, the United States Department of Defense publicly estimated that ISWAP had 3,500 to 5,000 fighters.[3] By late 2022, ISWAP's governorates appeared to differ in their tactics and equipment, ranging from the Lake Chad subdivision which deploys large numbers of uniformed, well-armed troops to the members of the "Central Nigeria" cell that is small in numbers and specializes in covert warfare and terrorist attacks.[38] In times of manpower shortages, ISWAP forcibly conscripts civilians into its ranks. Though these conscriptions can be direct in the form of militants entering villages and rounding up men, the group has also used economic pressure by raising very high taxes and then offering tax exemptions for those willing to take up arms.[74]
In addition, ISWAP has established a "Khilafah Cadet School" for 8-16 old boys. These are carefully selected, indoctrinated and given physical as well as military training. The child soldiers were featured in an ISWAP propaganda video titled "The Empowerment Generation", showing them executing captured Nigerian soldiers.[79] IS-Central had utilized child soldiers known as "Cubs of the Caliphate" from 2014 to 2017.[80]
Notes
^ abcA border area between Nigeria's Borno and Yobe states is known as the "Timbuktu Triangle".[15] The area is covered by the Alagarno forest.[16] The Timbuktu Triangle should not be confused with the city of Timbuktu in Mali.
Balai kota Lésigny. LésignyNegaraPrancisArondisemenMelunKantonBrie-Comte-RobertAntarkomunetidak ada pada 2007Pemerintahan • Wali kota (2008-2014) Gérard Ruffin • Populasi17,647Kode INSEE/pos77249 / 2 Population sans doubles comptes: penghitungan tunggal penduduk di komune lain (e.g. mahasiswa dan personil militer). Lésigny (pengucapan bahasa Prancis: [leziɲi]) merupakan sebuah komune di departemen Seine-et-Marne di region Île-de-France, di pinggiran tengga…
Abbaye d'AsnièresPrésentationDestination initiale abbayePropriétaire propriété privéePatrimonialité Classée MH (1909)LocalisationPays FranceRégion Pays de la LoireDépartement Maine-et-LoireCommune Cizay-la-MadeleineCoordonnées 47° 10′ 31″ N, 0° 11′ 28″ OLocalisation sur la carte de FranceLocalisation sur la carte de Maine-et-Loiremodifier - modifier le code - modifier Wikidata L'abbaye d'Asnières est une abbaye située à Cizay-la-Ma…
Argentine Marxist revolutionary (1928–1967) Che GuevaraGuerrillero HeroicoPicture taken by Alberto Korda on 5 March 1960, at the La Coubre memorial serviceMinister of Industries of CubaIn office11 February 1961 – 1 April 1965Prime MinisterFidel CastroPreceded byOffice establishedSucceeded byJoel Domenech BenítezPresident of the National Bank of CubaIn office26 November 1959 – 23 February 1961Preceded byFelipe PazosSucceeded byRaúl Cepero Bonilla Personal detailsBornErne…
Vasily GavrilovBirth nameVasily Timofeyvich GavrilovBorn6 March 1867Allegiance Russian EmpireService/branch Imperial Russian ArmyRanklieutenant generalCommands held10th Infantry Division1st Army CorpsBattles/warsBoxer RebellionRusso-Japanese WarWorld War I Vasily Timofeyvich Gavrilov (born 6 March 1867) was division and corps commanderin the military of the Russian Empire. He fought in the war against the Japanese Empire. He was promoted to Polkovnik in 1905 and major general in 1911. Award…
Isotop utama amerisium Isotop Peluruhan kelimpahan waktu paruh (t1/2) mode produk 241Am sintetis 432,2 thn SF – α 237Np 242m1Am sintetis 141 thn IT 242Am α 238Np SF – 243Am sintetis 7370 thn SF – α 239Np lihatbicarasunting Amerisium (95Am) adalah sebuah unsur buatan, sehingga berat atom standarnya tidak dapat diberikan. Seperti semua unsur buatan lainnya, ia tidak memiliki satu pun isotop stabil yang diketahui. Isotop pertama yang disintesis adalah 241Am…
1968 film by Barry Shear For other uses, see Wild in the Streets (disambiguation). Wild in the StreetsTheatrical release poster by Reynold BrownDirected byBarry ShearWritten byRobert ThomBased onshort story The Day It All Happened, Baby! by Robert ThomProduced by Samuel Z. Arkoff James H. Nicholson Starring Shelley Winters Christopher Jones Diane Varsi Hal Holbrook Millie Perkins Richard Pryor Bert Freed Kevin Coughlin Larry Bishop Ed Begley Narrated byPaul Frees (uncredited)CinematographyRichar…
Sombreros KiddosAlbum mini karya SoreDirilis5 April 2010 (2010-04-05)GenreChamber Pop, JazzLabelPurapura RecordsProduserSoreDJ OreoAghi NarottamaKronologi Sore Ports of Lima(2008) Sombreros Kiddos(2010) Sorealist(2013) Singel dalam album Sombreros Kiddos Silly Little ThingDirilis: 20 Juli 2011 Penilaian profesional Skor ulasan Sumber Nilai Pasar Musik [1] Denny Sakrie [2] Sombreros Kiddos merupakan album mini oleh Sore. Album mini ini dirilis pada 6 April 2010 di bawah l…
Irish hurler This article relies largely or entirely on a single source. Relevant discussion may be found on the talk page. Please help improve this article by introducing citations to additional sources.Find sources: Denis Grimes – news · newspapers · books · scholar · JSTOR (February 2013) Denis GrimesPersonal informationIrish name Donnchadha Ó GreacháinSport HurlingPosition GoalkeeperBorn August 7, 1864Kilfinane, County LimerickDied 1920(1920-00-00) …
Police station舊大澳警署Old Tai O Police Station in 2013.General informationTypePolice stationCurrent tenantsTai O Cultural Relics HotelCompleted1902Closed2002Technical detailsFloor count2Floor area1,000 square metres (11,000 sq ft)Designations Hong Kong Graded Building – Grade IIDesignated17 May 2010Reference no.440 Old Tai O Police StationTraditional Chinese舊大澳警署Simplified Chinese旧大澳警署TranscriptionsStandard MandarinHanyu PinyinJiù Dàào Jǐngsh…
معاهدة المساعدة القانونية المتبادلة هي اتفاقية [1] بين دولتين تهدف إلى تسهيل التعاون بين الشرطة والقضاء، ولا سيما فيما يتعلق بتبادل المعلومات والبيانات الشخصية أثناء التحقيقات الجارية، بهدف الحصول على الأدلة أو لتسهيل تنفيذ المعاهدات الضريبية التي تهدف إلى تجنب التهر…
Men's tanding 75 kg at the 2018 Asian GamesVenuePadepokan Pencak SilatDates23–29 August 2018Competitors10 from 10 nationsMedalists Trần Đình Nam Vietnam Mohd Fauzi Khalid Malaysia Daniiar Tokurov Kyrgyzstan Amri Rusdana Indonesia Pencak silat at the2018 Asian GamesSeniTunggalmenwomenGandamenwomenRegumenwomenTanding55 kgmenwomen60 kgmenwomen65 kgmenwomen70 kgmen75 kgmen90 kgmen95 kgmenvte Main article: …
For other uses, see Morrone (disambiguation). MorroneMorrone seen from Braemar Castle.Highest pointElevation859 m (2,818 ft)Prominence155 m (509 ft)ListingCorbett, MarilynNamingEnglish translationBig Hill or Big NoseLanguage of nameGaelicPronunciation/məˈroʊn/GeographyLocationAberdeenshire, ScotlandParent rangeGrampiansOS gridNO131886Topo mapOS Landranger 43, OS Explorer 387 Braemar as seen from high up on Morrone. Morrone (Scottish Gaelic: Mór Bheinn, or Mór Shròn…
Overview of religion in Houston Religious affiliation (2020) Christian 72% Protestant 40% Catholic 29% Other Christian 3% Unaffiliated 21% Muslim 2% Jewish 1% Buddhist 1% Hindu 0.5% Other faiths 1.5% Throughout its history the city of Houston, Texas has been religiously influenced by Protestant Christianity in the Bible Belt.[1] Since the latter half of the 20th century, the Houston area has become home to ma…
Basisdaten Titel: Strafprozessordnung[1] Abkürzung: StPO Art: Bundesgesetz Geltungsbereich: Bundesrepublik Deutschland Rechtsmaterie: Rechtspflege, Strafverfahrensrecht Fundstellennachweis: 312-2 Ursprüngliche Fassung vom: 1. Februar 1877(RGBl. S. 253) Inkrafttreten am: 1. Oktober 1879 Neubekanntmachung vom: 7. April 1987(BGBl. I S. 1074,ber. S. 1319) Letzte Änderung durch: Art. 2 G vom 26. Juli 2023(BGBl. I Nr. 203 vom 2. August 2023) Inkrafttreten derletzten Änderung: 1. Oktob…
House in Corsham, United KingdomMiddlewick HouseMiddlewick House in March 2022Former namesMiddle Pickwick HouseGeneral informationTypeHouseArchitectural styleGeorgianAddressMiddlewickTown or cityCorshamCountryUnited KingdomCoordinates51°26′23″N 2°12′13″W / 51.4397°N 2.2035°W / 51.4397; -2.2035Construction startedcirca 18th centuryOwnerNick and Nettie MasonDesignationsGrade II listed Middlewick House is a Grade II listed Georgian-style house just outside the to…
Irish professional footballer Rory Delap Delap playing for Stoke City in 2010Personal informationFull name Rory John DelapDate of birth (1976-07-06) 6 July 1976 (age 47)Place of birth Sutton Coldfield, EnglandHeight 6 ft 0 in (1.83 m)Position(s) MidfielderYouth career1992–1994 Carlisle UnitedSenior career*Years Team Apps (Gls)1994–1998 Carlisle United 65 (7)1998–2001 Derby County 103 (11)2001–2006 Southampton 132 (5)2006–2007 Sunderland 12 (1)2006 → Stoke City (lo…
Autovía AG-53 -Carballino AG-54 Autovía AG-53 -O Carballiño (en gallego) Galicia, España España Vista de la bifurcación a la AG-53 en Maside Autovía AG-53 -CarballinoDatos de la rutaIdentificador Tipo AutovíaNumeración PK 0 al PK 5,19Ancho de calzada 2 carriles por sentidoLongitud 5,19 kmAdministraciónAdministración Junta de Galicia Red Red de Carreteras de GaliciaOtros datosVelocidadgenérica Re…
French business jet Falcon 6X Falcon 6X at EBACE 2023 Role Business jetType of aircraft National origin France Manufacturer Dassault Aviation First flight 10 March 2021[1] Introduction 30 November 2023[2] The Dassault Falcon 6X is a large, long-range business jet under development by Dassault Aviation in France. Its precursor, the Falcon 5X twinjet, was launched in 2013, rolled-out in 2015 and made its first flight on July 5, 2017, but its development was frozen as its Safran Sil…
Kalahari CommandoKalahari Commando emblemCountry South AfricaAllegiance Republic of South Africa Republic of South Africa Branch South African Army South African Army TypeInfantryRoleLight InfantrySizeOne BattalionPart ofSouth African Infantry CorpsArmy Territorial Reserve, Group 21Garrison/HQVryburgEngagements1914-1915 SWA CampaignMilitary unit Kalahari Commando was a light infantry regiment of the South African Army. It formed part of the South African Army In…
1978 science fiction thriller film The Boys from BrazilTheatrical release posterDirected byFranklin J. SchaffnerScreenplay byHeywood GouldBased onThe Boys from Brazil by Ira LevinProduced byMartin RichardsStanley O'TooleexecutiveRobert FryerStarringGregory PeckLaurence OlivierCinematographyHenri DecaëEdited byRobert SwinkMusic byJerry GoldsmithProductioncompaniesITC EntertainmentProducer CircleDistributed by20th Century FoxRelease date October 6, 1978 (1978-10-06) [1]Runn…
American writer Caroline KepnesBorn (1976-11-10) November 10, 1976 (age 47)[1]Centerville, Massachusetts, U.S.Alma materBrown UniversityOccupations Writer screenwriter entertainment reporter Known forYou series:You novel (2014)Hidden Bodies (2016)You TV series (2018–present)You Love Me (2021)For You and Only You (2023)Other novels:Providence (2018)Websitecarolinekepnes.com Caroline Kepnes (born 10 November 1976) is an American writer,[2] screenwriter, author, and…
Questa voce sull'argomento calciatori emiratini è solo un abbozzo. Contribuisci a migliorarla secondo le convenzioni di Wikipedia. Segui i suggerimenti del progetto di riferimento. Walid Abbas Al-Bloushi Nazionalità Emirati Arabi Uniti Altezza 182 cm Peso 74 kg Calcio Ruolo Difensore Squadra Al-Ahli Carriera Squadre di club1 2004-2013 Al Shabab157 (12)2013- Al-Ahli208 (8) Nazionale 2008- Emirati Arabi Uniti112 (6) Palmarès Coppa delle Nazioni del Golfo Oro Bah…
Dicastery of the Roman Curia Congregation for the Evangelization of PeoplesLatin: Congregatio pro Gentium EvangelizationeCoat of arms of the Holy SeePalazzo di Propaganda Fide, seat of the Congregation for the Evangelization of PeoplesDicastery overviewFormedJune 22, 1622; 401 years ago (1622-06-22)Preceding DicasterySacred Congregation for the Propagation of the FaithDissolvedJune 5, 2022 (2022-06-05)Superseding agencyDicastery for EvangelizationHeadquartersPala…
This article is about the local government area. For the metropolis, see Adelaide. For the city centre, see Adelaide city centre. For other uses, see City of Adelaide (disambiguation). 34°56′S 138°36′E / 34.933°S 138.600°E / -34.933; 138.600 Local government area in South AustraliaCity of AdelaideSouth AustraliaLocation of Adelaide within the Adelaide metropolitan areaPopulation25,026 (2021 census)[1] • Density1,607.3/km2 (4,162.9/sq mi)Es…
Alexander Oroz Datos personalesNombre completo Alexander Antonio Oroz HuertaApodo(s) El Flecha[1]Nacimiento San Bernardo, Chile15 de diciembre de 2002 (21 años)Nacionalidad(es) ChilenaAltura 1,71 m (5′ 7″)Peso 64 kg (141 lb)Carrera deportivaDeporte FútbolClub profesionalDebut deportivo 4 de abril de 2021(Deportes Iquique)Club Colo-ColoLiga Primera División ChilenaPosición DelanteroDorsal(es) 20Goles en clubes 9 (32 PJ)Entrenador Gustavo QuinterosTrayectoria Col…
إلفيس سكوت معلومات شخصية الميلاد 1 أغسطس 1978 (46 سنة) بورتو كورتيس الطول 1.82 م (5 قدم 11 1⁄2 بوصة) مركز اللعب مهاجم الجنسية هندوراس الرقم 9 المسيرة الاحترافية1 سنوات فريق م. (هـ.) 1996–2001 بلاتنسي 62 (21) 2001–2002 نادي ديبورتيفو أوليمبيا 2002 ماراثون 37 (13) 2003 نادي أليانزا…
1992 single by Naughty by NatureHip Hop HooraySingle by Naughty by Naturefrom the album 19 Naughty III B-sideThe Hood Comes FirstReleasedDecember 10, 1992RecordedFebruary 1992StudioUnique Recording Studios, New York City[1]GenreHip hopLength4:26LabelTommy Boy RecordsSongwriter(s)Ronald Isley, Ernie Isley, Rudolph Isley, Chris Jasper, O'Kelly Isley Jr., Marvin Isley, Vincent Brown, Anthony Criss, Keir GistProducer(s)DJ Kay GeeNaughty by Nature singles chronology Uptown Anthem (1992) Hip H…
Este artículo o sección necesita referencias que aparezcan en una publicación acreditada.Este aviso fue puesto el 5 de noviembre de 2017. Anthony Straker Datos personalesNacimiento Londres, Inglaterra23 de septiembre de 1988 (35 años)Nacionalidad(es) Altura 1.75 metrosCarrera deportivaDeporte FútbolClub profesionalDebut deportivo 2006(Crystal Palace)Club Havant & Waterlooville Football ClubLiga National League SouthPosición MediocampistaSelección nacionalSelección Granada G…
