"Graphs and Cooperation in Games," Mathematics of Operations Research 2 (1977), 225–229.
"Two-Person Bargaining Problems and Comparable Utility," Econometrica 45 (1977), 1631–1637.
"Refinements of the Nash Equilibrium Concept," International Journal of Game Theory 7 (1978), 73–80.
"Incentive Compatibility and the Bargaining Problem," Econometrica 47 (1979), 61–73.
"Optimal Auction Design," Mathematics of Operations Research 6 (1981), 58–73.
"Mechanism Design by an Informed Principal," Econometrica 51 (1983), 1767–1797.
"Two-Person Bargaining Problems with Incomplete Information," Econometrica 52 (1984), 461–487.
"Bayesian Equilibrium and Incentive Compatibility," in Social Goals and Social Organization, édition L. Hurwicz, D. Schmeidler, et Hugo F. Sonnenschein, Cambridge University Press (1985), 229–259.
"Economic Analysis of Political Institutions: An Introduction," Advances in Economic Theory and Econometrics: Theory and Applications, volume 1, edited by D. Kreps and K. Wallis (Cambridge University Press, 1997), pages 46–65.
"Theoretical Comparisons of Electoral Systems," European Economic Review 43 (1999), 671–697.
Livres
Game Theory: Analysis of Conflict, Harvard University Press, 1991.
Probability Models for Economic Decisions, Duxbury Press, 2005.
(en) Autobiographie sur le site de la fondation Nobel (le bandeau sur la page comprend plusieurs liens relatifs à la remise du prix, dont un document rédigé par la personne lauréate — le Prize Lecture — qui détaille ses apports)