Modern Russian claims to Imperial/Soviet-era territory
Russia and its territorial possessions throughout the Imperial (1721–1917) and the Soviet era (1922–1991), excluding Russian America (1741–1867) Soviet/post-Soviet territories that were never part of Imperial Russia: Tuva (1944–), East Prussia (1945–), western Ukraine (1939–1991), and Kuril Islands (1945–) Imperial territories/states that did not become part of the Soviet Union: Finland (1809–1917), Poland (1815–1915), and Kars (1878–1918) Soviet sphere of influence: Warsaw Pact (1945–1991; Albania until 1968; East Germany until 1990), Mongolia (1924–1991) Imperial sphere of influence and Soviet military occupation: northern Iran (1914–1918; 1941–1946), Manchuria (1892–1906; 1945–1946), northern Korea (1892–1906; 1945–1948), Xinjiang (1934), eastern Austria (1945–1955), and Afghanistan (1979–1989)
Specifically looking at the viewpoints of post-Soviet Russian leader Vladimir Putin, Erdi Ozturk, a professor at London Metropolitan University, has commented that irredentist ideology relies upon a "distinction between civilizations by synthesizing nationalism with nostalgic visions of history, memory, and religion."[2]
History
Imperial era
From roughly the 16th century to the 20th century, the Russian Empire followed an expansionist policy.[n 1] Few of these actions had irredentist justifications, though the conquest of parts of the Ottoman Empire in the Caucasus in 1877 to bring Armenian Christians under the protection of the Tsar may represent one example.[3] Russia has also had an enduring interest in Constantinople (Istanbul), which was envisioned as the centre of Russian power.[4]
Post-Soviet era
Russian-occupied and Russian-claimed territories in Europe as of 2023
After the dissolution of the Soviet Union in 1991, it was thought that the Russian Federation had given up on plans of territorial expansion or kin-state nationalism, despite some 25 million ethnic Russians living in neighboring countries outside Russia.[5]Stephen M. Saideman and R. William Ayres assert that Russia followed a non-irredentist policy in the 1990s despite some justifications for irredentist policies—one factor disfavoring irredentism was a focus by the ruling interest in consolidating power and the economy within the territory of Russia.[6] Furthermore, a stable policy of irredentism popular with the electorate was not found, and politicians proposing such ideas did not fare well electorally.[7] Russian nationalist politicians tended to focus on internal threats (i.e. "outsiders") rather than on the interests of Russians outside the federation.[8]
Following the Crimea annexation, armed Russian-backed separatists seized towns in the eastern Donbas region of Ukraine, sparking the Donbas War. They declared their captured territory to be the Donetsk and Luhansk "people's republics". During this unrest, Putin began referring to "Novorossiya" (New Russia), a former Russian imperial territory that covered much of southern Ukraine.[19] Russian-backed forces then announced plans for a new Novorossiya, to incorporate all of eastern and southern Ukraine.[20][21]
A 2015 survey by the Pew Research Center found that "61 percent of Russians believe parts of neighboring countries really belong to Russia".[22]
In his 2021 essay "On the Historical Unity of Russians and Ukrainians", Putin referred to Russians, Ukrainians and Belarusians as "one people" making up a triune Russian nation. He maintained that large parts of Ukraine are historical Russian lands and claimed there is "no historical basis" for the "idea of Ukrainian people as a nation separate from the Russians".[23][24]
On 21 February 2022, the Kremlin recognized the Russian-controlled territories of Ukraine as independent states—the Donetsk and Luhansk "people's republics"—as well as their irredentist claims to the wider Donbas region of Ukraine. The following day, Russia announced that it was sending troops into these territories.[25][26]
On 24 February 2022, Russia launched a full invasion of Ukraine.[27] In announcing the invasion, Putin repeatedly denied Ukraine's right to exist, calling the country "an inalienable part of our own history, culture and spiritual space", and claiming that it was created by Russia.[28] It has been referred to as an irredentist war, going against the norm since World War II that sees territorial conquest as unacceptable.[29] Parallels were made between Putin's irredentism during the Ukrainian War and Slobodan Milosevic's irredentism during the Bosnian War.[30]
On 1 March 2022, images emerged in the press showing Belarusian President Alexander Lukashenko in front of a map which appeared to show invasion plans for Moldova where Russia already has soldiers in the breakaway region of Transnistria.[31][32]South Ossetian President Anatoly Bibilov announced his intention to begin the process of annexation by the Russian Federation.[33]
Four months into the invasion of Ukraine, Putin compared himself to Russian emperor Peter the Great. He claimed that Tsar Peter had returned "Russian land" to the empire, adding "it is now also our responsibility to return (Russian) land". Peter Dickinson of the Atlantic Council sees these comments as proof that Putin "is waging an old-fashioned imperial war of conquest".[34]
On 8 June 2022, a draft bill was submitted to Russia's State Duma by a member of the ruling United Russia party proposing to repeal the Decree of the State Council of the Soviet Union "On the Recognition of the Independence of the Republic of Lithuania".[35][36][37] On 6 July, the speaker of the State Duma, Vyacheslav Volodin, threatened to "claim back" Alaska if the US froze or seized Russian assets.[38] Previously, another member of the State Duma, Oleg Matveychev, had demanded in response to sanctions that the US return Alaska, in addition to Fort Ross, California (which was historically a Russian colony). Matveychev also demanded the recognition of Antarctica as part of Russia, which in total would almost double Russia's territory.[39]
In September 2022, referendums on joining Russia were held in four Russian-occupied regions of Ukraine: the Donetsk People's Republic, the Luhansk People's Republic, Zaporizhzhia region and Kherson region. The Russian occupation authorities announced that all regions had overwhelmingly voted in favor of joining Russia and that there had been a high turnout despite the ongoing war and depopulation. It was widely dismissed as a sham referendum by Ukraine and many other countries.[40][41] On 30 September, Putin announced in a speech[42] that Russia had annexed the four regions.[43] The annexations were declared illegal by the UN. On 12 October 2022, the United Nations General Assembly passed Resolution ES-11/4 advocating for territorial integrity of Ukraine, with 143 nations voting in favor, 5 against and 35 abstaining. It condemned the "illegal so-called referendums" and the "attempted illegal annexation" and demanded that Russia immediately reverse its decisions and withdraw its forces from Ukraine.[44]
Dmitry Medvedev, deputy chairman of the Security Council of Russia and former Russian president, said that Ukraine should not exist in any form and that Russia will continue to wage war against any independent Ukrainian state.[45] He commented that Putin outlined "why Ukraine did not exist, does not exist, and will not exist".[46] In a March 2024 speech, Medvedev described Ukraine as part of Russia,[47] and spoke in front of a large map showing Russia in control of most of the country, with western Ukraine partitioned between other countries, and Ukraine confined to a rump state consisting of the city of Kyiv and the Kyiv Oblast.[48]
Looking at the Russian efforts as a whole, the news network Al Jazeera has quoted University of San Francisco scholar Stephen Zunes as remarking, "The level of physical devastation and casualties thus far over a relatively short period is perhaps the [worst] in recent decades which, combined with the irredentist aims of the conquest, makes Russia's war on Ukraine particularly reprehensible in the eyes of the international community."[2]
U.S. news publication The Washington Post has stated that the Russian government could start a chain reaction of irredentist mass violence, which then "could break the international order".[52]
^Tristan James Mabry; John McGarry; Margaret Moore; Brendan O'Leary (2013). Divided Nations and European Integration: National and Ethnic Conflict in the 21st Century. University of Pennsylvania Press. p. 365. ISBN9780812244977.
^Armando Navarro (2015). Mexicano and Latino Politics and the Quest for Self-Determination: What Needs to Be Done. Lexington Books. p. 536. ISBN9780739197363.
^Joseph J. Hobbs (2016). Fundamentals of World Regional Geography. Cengage Learning. p. 183. ISBN9781305854956.
^Bocharova, Svetlana; Biryukova, Liliya (18 March 2014). "Приднестровье как Крым" [Transnistria as Crimea]. Vedomosti (in Russian). Archived from the original on 11 December 2021. Retrieved 8 June 2021.
^Harun Karcic (March 30, 2022). "Why NATO Should Worry About the Balkans". The Economist. Retrieved March 31, 2022. The similarities between Russian and Serbian irredentism are astonishing. Back in the 1990s, Serbian nationalists parroted the claim that Bosnia historically belonged to Serbia, that we Bosniak Muslims were in fact Christian Serbs who were forcefully converted to Islam under the Ottomans, and that Bosnia—as an independent and sovereign country—would not survive without Serbian tutelage. So closely are Bosniak Muslims able to identify with Ukrainians that monetary donations have been collected and prayers held at Bosnian mosques for Ukraine's defense.
