The UFWD focuses its work on people or entities that are outside the CCP, especially in the overseas Chinese diaspora, who hold political, commercial, or academic influence, or who represent interest groups.[4][5] Through its efforts, the UFWD seeks to ensure that these individuals and groups are supportive of or useful to CCP interests and that potential critics remain divided.[6][7][8]
United front policies were most used in two periods before the Chinese Communist Revolution, namely from 1924 to 1927, and from 1936 to 1945, when the CCP cooperated with the Nationalist Party ostensibly to defeat the Japanese.[13] The simplest formulation of united front work in the period was to "rally as many allies as possible in order to...defeat a common enemy."[13] According to Mareike Ohlberg, its stated goal was to "build the broadest possible coalition with all social forces that are relevant".[14]
In the early years, the CCP also used united front policies to cooperate with "disaffected warlords, religious believers, ethnic minorities, overseas Chinese, and minor parties and groups," in order for the CCP to appear democratic and to persuade key groups that the Nationalists were "illegitimate and repressive while the CCP embodied progress, unity, and democracy."[13]
After seizing power, the CCP continued to deploy united front strategies to train intellectuals, "and, using thought reform based on criticism, began the transformation of the old society intellectuals." This involved violent elimination of what were termed "bourgeois and idealistic political beliefs," to instill faith in "class struggle and revolutionary change."[13]
Cultural Revolution
During the Cultural Revolution, the UFWD was accused of being "capitulationist" and forced to shut down.[15]
Reform-era
In the late 1970s the policy was used for the common cause of economic reform. From there the CCP expanded the scope of its work internationally during the reform era, and again following the 1989 Tiananmen Square protests and massacre. The department includes a bureau tasked with handling Hong Kong, Macau, Taiwan, and overseas affairs, and articulates the importance of using overseas Chinese populations to promote unification.[16]
It played an important role in building support for "One country, two systems" in Hong Kong during the 1980s and 1990s,[18] operating under the name of the "Coordination Department."[19] The UFWD has been critically described as serving to co-opt non-Communist community leaders outside China, and "using them to neutralize Party critics," sometimes coercively.[20]
Scholar of Chinese political history John P. Burns presents in his book The Chinese Communist Party's Nomenklatura System excerpts from internal party documents demonstrating the role of the UFWD. The UFWD is to "implement better the party's united front policy and to assess and understand patriotic personages in different fields... so that we can arrange for correct placements for them and fully mobilize and bring into play their positive role in the Four Modernizations and to accomplish the return of Taiwan to the motherland so as to fulfill the cause of uniting the whole country, and to carry forward and solidify the revolutionary, patriotic united front."[21]
The UFWD was used in the early years of PRC rule "to guarantee CCP oversight" over groups that were not directly associated with the Party and government. Those groups, including NGOs, were brought under the authority of the UFWD, whose job it was to “continuing to play its part in mobilizing and rallying the whole people in common struggle” after the Liberation in 1949. When the CCP "shifted its focus from the 'mass line' to 'class struggle', the real united front disappeared. While the United Front Department still existed, its duties of uniting with all forces for the 'common struggle' shifted mainly to serving the Party's leadership and 'consolidating the proletarian dictatorship'," according to Brookings Institution visiting fellow Zhang Ye.[22] According to Roger Faligot, the aftermath of the 1989 Tiananmen Square protests and massacre led to the "growing use of party organizations, such as the United Front Work Department and friendship associations, as fronts for intelligence operations."[23]: 182 Based on their actions in Taiwan and elsewhere the United Front Work Department appears to be used as a cover to conduct intelligence operations against targets of interest to the CCP.[24]
Xi administration
In 2018, the United Front Work Department went through a reorganization in which it absorbed the State Administration for Religious Affairs (SARA) and the Overseas Chinese Affairs Office (OCAO) to become two internal bureaus.[12][25][26] As part of the "one institution with two names" system, the UFWD retains OCAO and SARA (also called National Religious Affairs Administration) as external nameplates.[27] The UFWD also assumed direct control of the National Ethnic Affairs Commission.[28][29] With the reorganization, the UFWD effectively became China's main agency overseeing and managing ethnic, religious and overseas Chinese affairs.[30][28] The State Religious Affairs Commission and the State Council Overseas Chinese Office were also merged within the United Front Work Department.[31]: 77
Structure
The UFWD is reported to have over 40,000 personnel and does not disclose its budget.[32][33] However, it was estimated to have a budget of at least US$2.6 billion in 2019.[1] It oversees and directs eight minor and subordinate political parties and the All-China Federation of Industry and Commerce.[34]
Between 2015 and 2018, the UFWD grew to 12 bureaus:[5][35]
General Office (办公厅): Oversees the functioning of the department, including its finances, security, assets, and work with other government and Party bodies.
Policy and Theory Research Office (政策理论研究室): Handles ideological and policy research, internal propaganda, and the drafting of important documents. Works with other government agencies to develop propaganda efforts abroad.
First Bureau—Party Work Bureau (一局，党派工作局): Governs affairs related to the eight minor, non-Communist parties legally allowed to operate in China.
Second Bureau—Minority and Religious Work Bureau (二局，民族工作局): Researches and recommends policy on minorities in the country, and liaises with other government agencies in their related work. Also supervises religious work.
Third Bureau—Hong Kong, Macau and Taiwan United Front Work Bureau (三局，港澳台统战工作局): Coordinates and communicates with friendly figures in Hong Kong, Macau, and Taiwan.
Fourth Bureau—Non-public Economic Work Bureau (四局，非公有制经济工作局): Coordinates with figures from the private sector.
Fifth Bureau—Independent and Non-Party Intellectuals Work Bureau (五局，无党派、党外知识分子工作局): Liaises with intellectuals not formally affiliated with the Communist Party.
Sixth Bureau—New Social Class Representatives Work Bureau (六局，新的社会阶层人士工作局): Focuses on the "new social class", i.e., the rising Chinese middle class.
Seventh Bureau (七局): Responsible for ethnic minority and religious work, particularly as it relates to Tibet.
Eighth Bureau (八局): Responsible for ethnic minority and religious work, particularly as it relates to Xinjiang.
Ninth Bureau—Overseas Chinese Affairs General Bureau (九局，侨务综合局): Coordinates and communicates with friendly figures in overseas Chinese affairs. The UFWD's Ninth Bureau runs the China Overseas Friendship Association (COFA).[36][37] COFA and the China Overseas Exchange Association (COEA) merged in 2019.[38]
Tenth Bureau—Overseas Chinese Affairs Bureau (十局，侨务事务局): Coordinates and communicates with friendly figures in overseas Chinese affairs.
Eleventh Bureau—Religious Work General Bureau (十一局，宗教综合局): Researches and recommends policy on religious affairs in the country, and liaises with other government agencies in their related work.
Twelfth Bureau—Religious Work Bureau (十二局，宗教业务局): Researches and recommends policy on religious affairs in the country, and liaises with other government agencies in their related work.
Department Party Committee (机关党委)
Retired Cadre Office (离退休干部办公室): responsible for the welfare of retired employees of the department.
The UFWD uses several methods in pursuit of its goals to appeal to its targets. Its primary method involves outreach, including holding events, trainings, media tours and other similar activities. This includes examples such as inviting members of the "new social class" to attend the "large-scale celebration to commemorate the Shenzhen Special Economic Zone’s 40th anniversary" or inviting members of the private sector to attend a multi-week training course. Another method it uses is to providing good and services, including issuing tenders for infrastructure and development projects, from road improvements to increasing access to drinking water.[35]
Alex Joske has noted that there is no clear distinction between domestic and overseas UFWD activity and often overlap between the two.[5] Scholar Martin Thorley has described the UFWD as being able to call upon a "latent network" of civic, educational, and non-governmental groups and affiliated individuals internally and abroad for its political purposes, especially in times of crisis.[42] For instance, the UFWD uses members of the Chinese People's Political Consultative Conference and other organizations to carry out influence-building activities, often covertly.[2][43] Researchers from Stanford University's Internet Observatory and the Hoover Institution describe the United Front as "cultivat[ing] pro-Beijing perspectives in the Chinese diaspora and the wider world by rewarding those it deems friendly with accolades and lucrative opportunities, while orchestrating social and economic pressure against critics. This pressure is often intense but indirect, and clear attribution is therefore difficult."[44]
The UFWD and its affiliated front organizations have also served as cover for intelligence agents of the Ministry of State Security.[5][45] Multiple national intelligence agencies have expressed concern that the mandate and operations of the UFWD can constitute undue interference in other nations' internal affairs.[46][20] In their book Nest of Spies, de Pierrebourg and Juneau-Katsuya allege that the United Front Work Department "manages important dossiers concerning foreign countries. These include propaganda, the control of Chinese students abroad, the recruiting of agents among the Chinese diaspora (and among sympathetic foreigners), and long-term clandestine operations."[47]
The Chinese People's Association for Friendship with Foreign Countries has been described as the "public face" of the UFWD.[48] Scholar Jichang Lulu noted that the UFWD and its proxy organizations "re-purpose democratic governance structures to serve as tools of extraterritorial influence."[49] An Atlantic writer stated China runs thousands of linked and subsidized pro-government groups across Europe, to "ensure that its overseas citizens, and others of ethnic Chinese descent, are loyal", to "shape the conversation about China in Europe", and to "bring back technology and expertise", and that the UFWD plays a "crucial" role in this project.[50] Scholar Jeffrey Stoff has argued that the CCP's United Front "influence apparatus intersects with or directly supports its global technology transfer apparatus."[51][52]
In March 2018, it was announced that the Overseas Chinese Affairs Office would be absorbed into the United Front Work Department.[26][53] With the absorption of the Overseas Chinese Affairs Office, the UFWD gained full control of the country's second largest state-run media apparatus, the China News Service.[26] In 2019, the UFWD partnered with the Cyberspace Administration of China to promote united front work with social media influencers.[5]
In October 2024, Swedish reporters working as part of an international consortium of journalists identified 233 individuals across Europe connected to the united front system.[58] According to the Jamestown Foundation, a Washington, D.C.-based think tank, its research has uncovered 103 united front-linked groups in Sweden spanning all areas of society, including culture, business, politics, and media.[58]
The UFWD sponsors paid trips and summer camps to mainland China for Taiwanese youth. The trips are reported to promote pro-Chinese unification sentiment.[59]
The UFWD has also allegedly interfered in foreign elections, including the 2019 Canadian federal election.[60] Following the 2019 Canadian Parliament infiltration plot, the Privy Council Office warned that election interference by China was "likely to be more persistent and pervasive in future elections" and that "the UFWD’s extensive network of quasi-official and local community and interest groups, allow it to obfuscate communication and the flow of funds between Canadian targets and Chinese officials."[61]
Reaction
A 2018 report by the United States–China Economic and Security Review Commission noted that the UFWD regularly attempts to suppress overseas protests and acts of expression critical of the CCP are a conspiracy against rights.[2] In May 2020, the White House released a report titled "U.S. Strategic Approach to the People's Republic of China".[62] That report stated that "CCP United Front organizations and agents target businesses, universities, think tanks, scholars, journalists, and local, state, and Federal officials in the United States and around the world, attempting to influence discourse and restrict external influence inside the PRC."[63][64] In June 2020, the Australian Strategic Policy Institute issued a report advocating a multi-dimensional response involving law enforcement as well as legislative reform for greater transparency of foreign influence operations.[5] The same month the Republican Study Committee in the United States called for sanctions on the UFWD and its top leadership.[65]
In January 2022, MI5 issued an "interference alert" for a solicitor in the UK named Christine Lee suspected of political interference on behalf of the UFWD.[66][67] In a February 2022 ruling, a Canadian court stated that the UFWD's Overseas Chinese Affairs Office "engages in covert and surreptitious intelligence gathering”.[68] In July 2023, a group of U.S. senators asked the United States Department of Justice to investigate "Overseas Chinese Service Centers" with alleged ties to the UFWD that are operating in seven U.S. cities.[69][70]
In May 2023, a U.S. man, Liang Litang, was indicted for acting as an illegal agent of the Chinese government and for surveilling and harassing Chinese dissidents. Liang allegedly passed information to officials of the UFWD and Ministry of Public Security.[75][76]
Department heads
During two periods the United Front Work Department was without a leader, from 1966 to 1975 during the Cultural Revolution and from the end of 1989 until 22 November 1990 following the 1989 Tiananmen Square protests and massacre. The UFWD has had two female heads, Liu Yandong (2002–2007) and Sun Chunlan (2014–2017).[23]
^Lo, Sonny Shiu-Hing; Hung, Steven Chung-Fun; Loo, Jeff Hai-Chi (2019). China's New United Front Work in Hong Kong: Penetrative Politics and Its Implications. Singapore: Springer Nature Singapore. doi:10.1007/978-981-13-8483-7. ISBN978-981-13-8482-0. S2CID191713443.
^Cooper, Sam (2022-06-08). Wilful Blindness: How a network of narcos, tycoons and CCP agents infiltrated the West. Optimum Publishing International. ISBN978-0-88890-330-3.
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