The Siliguri Corridor, also known as the Chicken's Neck, is a stretch of land around the city of Siliguri in West Bengal, India.[1][2] 20–22 kilometres (12–14 mi) at the narrowest section, this geo-political and geo-economical corridor connects the seven states of northeast India to the rest of India.[1] The countries of Nepal and Bangladesh lie on each side of the corridor and the Kingdom of Bhutan lies at the northern end of the corridor. The Kingdom of Sikkim formerly lay on the northern side of the corridor, until its occupation by India in 1975.
The city of Siliguri, in the state of West Bengal, is the major city in this area and the central transfer point in eastern South Asia that connects Bhutan, Nepal, Bangladesh, Sikkim, Darjeeling, and Northeast India to one another.
The Kingdom of Sikkim formerly lay on the northern side of the corridor, until its union with India in 1975 via a publicly held referendum.[4][5] This gave India a buffer to the north of the Siliguri Corridor and consolidated India's control over the western side of the Chumbi Valley.
Location and dimensions
The dimensions of the corridor are a matter of interpretation.[6] Descriptions give it an area of 170 by 60 km (106 by 37 mi) with the narrowest section being 20–22 km (12–14 mi).[1][2]Kamal Jit Singh places the length at 200 km (120 mi) with a width of 17 to 60 km (11 to 37 mi), giving it an area of approximately 12,200 km2 (4,700 sq mi).[6]
Another description places its dimensions as approximately 200 km (120 mi) in length and 20 to 60 km (12 to 37 mi) wide, also giving it an area of approximately 12,200 km2 (4,700 sq mi).[7]
The corridor is located between Bangladesh to the south-west, Nepal on the northwest, and proximate to Bhutan in the north.[8] Between Sikkim and Bhutan lies the Chumbi ValleyTibetan territory.[9] The southern end of the Dolam plateau or Doklam triboundary area slopes into the corridor.[10] At the narrowest stretch, the corridor is generally formed by the Mechi River in the east; Nepal's Bhadrapur lies on the banks of the river.[11] Further north the Mechi Bridge connects Mechinagar.[12][13]
Current situation
This section needs to be updated. Please help update this article to reflect recent events or newly available information.(August 2017)
There is no free-trade agreement between Bangladesh and India. The Tetulia Corridor, an alternative to the Siliguri Corridor, is proposed under Article VIII of the India–Bangladesh Trade Agreement 1980, which states that "The two governments agree to make mutually beneficial arrangements for the use of their waterways, railways and roadways for commerce between the two countries and for passage of goods between two places in one country through the territory of the other".[citation needed] However, the proposal is still in the initial stages of negotiation.
The threat of a Chinese advance is still considered by Indian planners.[15] A Chinese military advance of less than 130 km (81 mi) would cut off Bhutan, part of West Bengal and all of North-East India, an area containing almost 50 million people. This situation arose during the war between India and China in 1962.[9] The security threat to this corridor was heightened during the 2017 Doklam incident.[16] The probability of China cutting off seven states in northeast India has been questioned.[17]
In popular culture
Humphrey Hawksley, in his 2000 novel Dragon Fire, briefly authors a situation where China cuts off India's land route to its northeastern territories.[7]Assassin's Mace (2011) by Brigadier Bob Butalia also involves such a situation involving Doklam and Jaldhaka River.[6]
Ghosh, Atig (2018). "The Importance of Being Siliguri. Border-Effect and the 'Untimely' City in North Bengal". In Neilson, Brett; Rossiter, Ned; Samaddar, Ranabir (eds.). Logistical Asia: The Labour of Making a World Region. Palgrave Macmillan, Springer. ISBN9789811083334. LCCN2018935185.
Malik, Hasan Yaser (December 2015). "Siliguri: A Geopolitical Manoeuvre Corridor in the Eastern Himalayan Region for China and India". Contemporary Chinese Political Economy and Strategic Relations. 1 (3): 699–720.