In 2016, Hart won the Nobel Prize in Economics with Bengt Holmström for their work on contract theory, including his work on how ownership should be allocated and when contracting is beneficial over ownership.[11][12]
Hart is an expert on contract theory, theory of the firm, corporate finance, and law and economics. His research centers on the roles that ownership structure and contractual arrangements play in the governance and boundaries of corporations. His research has emphasized the importance of contractual incompleteness — the inability of parties to contract on every contingency.[14] He has used his theoretical work on firms in two legal cases as a government expert (Black and Decker v. U.S.A. and WFC Holdings Corp. (Wells Fargo) v. U.S.A.) where companies claimed tax-related benefits as a result from selling some of their business. The government used Hart's research to claim that because the companies retained control of the sold assets, they could not lay claim to the tax benefits.[9][11]
Personal life
Hart holds dual British and United States citizenship.[15]
He is married to Rita B. Goldberg, a Harvard literature professor and author of the second-generation Holocaust memoir Motherland: Growing Up With the Holocaust.[7][16] They have two sons and two grandsons.
Books
Firms, Contracts, and Financial Structure (Oxford University Press, 1995).
Selected articles
"On the Optimality of Equilibrium when the Market Structure is Incomplete", Journal of Economic Theory, December 1975, pp. 418–443
"Takeover Bids, the Free-rider problem, and the Theory of the Corporation" (with Sanford J. Grossman), Bell Journal of Economics, Spring 1980, pp. 42–64
"The Market Mechanism as an Incentive Scheme", Bell Journal of Economics, 14 (Autumn 1983), pp. 366–82.
"The Costs and Benefits of Ownership: A Theory of Vertical and Lateral Integration" (with Sanford J. Grossman), Journal of Political Economy, August 1986, pp. 691–719.
"One Share-One Vote and the Market for Corporate Control" (with Sanford J. Grossman), Journal of Financial Economics, 1988
"Incomplete Contracts and Renegotiation" (with John Hardman Moore), Econometrica 56(4) (July 1988).
"Property Rights and the Nature of the Firm" (with John Hardman Moore), Journal of Political Economy 98(6) (1990).
" A Theory of Debt Based on the Inalienability of Human Capital" (with John Hardman Moore), Quarterly Journal of Economics, November 1994, pp. 841–879