In 1984, to protect DES against exhaustive search attacks, Ron Rivest proposed DESX: XOR a pre-whitening key to the plaintext, encrypt the result with DES using a secret key, and then XOR a postwhitening key to the encrypted result to produce the final ciphertext.[3]
In 1991, motivated by Rivest's DESX construction, Even and Mansour proposed a much simpler scheme (the "two-key Even–Mansour scheme"), which they suggested was perhaps the simplest possible block cipher: XOR the plaintext with a prewhitening key, apply a publicly known unkeyed permutation (in practice, a pseudorandom permutation) to the result, and then XOR a postwhitening key to the permuted result to produce the final ciphertext.[3][4]
Studying simple Even–Mansour style block ciphers gives insight into the security of Feistel ciphers (DES-like ciphers) and helps understand block cipher design in general.[5]
Orr Dunkelman, Nathan Keller, and Adi Shamir later proved it was possible to simplify the Even–Mansour scheme even further and still retain the same provable security, producing the "single-key Even–Mansour scheme": XOR the plaintext with the key, apply a publicly known unkeyed permutation to the result, and then XOR the same key to the permuted result to produce the final ciphertext.[3][6]
In 2004, Rogaway presented the XEX scheme with key and location-dependent "tweaks":[7]
Rogaway used XEX to allow efficient processing of consecutive blocks (with respect to the cipher used) within one data unit (e.g., a disk sector) for whole-disk encryption.[7]