Neo-Ba'athism is primarily associated with Assadism, based on the policies of the successive governments of Hafez al-Assad and his son Bashar al-Assad. This system was largely characterized by nepotism and sectarianism, with Hafez al-Assad's seizure of power in the 1970 Syrian coup d'état leading to the consolidation of Alawiteminority dominance within the military and security forces.[6] State propaganda portrayed Assadism as a neo-Ba'athist current that evolved Ba'athist ideology with the needs of the modern era.[7] Neo-Ba'athism has been criticized by the founder of Ba'athist ideology, Michel Aflaq, for diverging from the original principles of Ba'athism.[8]
Ideology
Neo-Ba'athism advocates the creation of a "vanguard" of leftist revolutionaries committed to build an egalitarian, socialist state in Syria and other Arab countries before making steps to achieve pan-Arab unity. The vanguard organisation is the Ba'ath party; which advocates class-struggle against the traditional Syrian economic elite classes; the big agriculturalists, industrialists, bourgeoisie and feudal landlords. By the 1970s, 85% of agricultural lands were distributed to landless peasant populations and tenant farmers. Banks, oil companies, power production and 90% of large-scale industries were nationalised. The neo-Ba'athists led by Salah Jadid who came to power in 1966 concentrated on improving the Syrian economy and exporting the doctrines of class-conflict and militant socialist revolution to the neighbouring countries. This view was challenged by General Hafez al-Assad and his neo-Ba'ath faction; who were proponents of a military-centric approach and focused on a strategy of strengthening the Syrian military to defend the socialist government against imperialist forces and their alleged internal collaborators. Assad favoured reconciliation of various leftist factions and pursued better relations with other Arab states. Although majority of the party members favoured Salah, Hafez was able to gain the upperhand following the events of the 1970 coup dubbed the "Corrective Movement" in official Syrian Ba'ath history. Assad's victory also marked the supersedure of the military over the Ba'ath party structures; making the armed forces a central centre of political power.[9][10][11][12]
Stance on religion
Neo-Ba'athism views religion as the "foremost symbol of reaction" preventing the birth of a modern socialist society, and advocate strict state supervision over religious activities for sustaining what its ideologues regard as a healthy, secularist society. During Salah Jadid's reign in power, the Ba'ath postured itself as a strongly anti-religious political entity; adhering to the Marxist–Leninist approach of top-down regimentation of the society through liquidation of what it regarded as "reactionary" classes such as the traditional ulema. The Grand Mufti's official status was downgraded by the Ba'athist government and the conventional role of religious clergy in state functioning was curtailed. While state ministers, officials, educators, etc. regularly preached about the "perils of religion"; party periodicals and magazines during the 1960s regularly made predictions about the "impending demise" of religion through the socialist revolution.[13]
During the rule of Salah Jadid, neo-Ba'athist ideologues openly denounced religion as a source of what they considered as the backwardness of the Arabs.[14] Following popular revulsion at Jadid's blatant anti-religious policies, Hafez al-Assad began to tone down the secularisation programme during the 1970s, by co-opting some pro-government clerics like Ramadan al-Bouti to counter the Islamic opposition and granted them a degree of autonomy from the regime. Simultaneously, the regime began the "nationalization" of religious discourse through a loyal clerical network, and condemned anyone deviating from the state-promoted "Ba'thist version of Islam" as a threat to the society.[15] The state-sponsored religious discourse during the rule of Hafez al-Assad promoted a left-wing nationalist worldview that sought to anathematize Islamists and re-inforce loyalty towards the Alawite president.[16]
Criticism
Salah al-Din al-Bitar, a member of the classical Ba'athist leadership, stated that the 1966 Syrian coup d'état "marked the end of Ba'athist politics in Syria". Ba'ath party founder Michel Aflaq shared the sentiment by stating, "I no longer recognise my party!"[8]
According to Jamal al-Atassi, co-founder of the Arab Ba'ath Party, stated that "Assadism is a false nationalism. It's the domination of a minority, and I'm not talking just of the Alawites, who control the society's nervous system. I include also the army and the mukhabarat. [...] And despite its socialist slogans, the state is run by a class who has made a fortune without contributing—a nouvelle bourgeoisie parasitaire."[17]
Neo-Ba'athism took power in Syria following the 1966 Syrian coup d'état. After the 1967 Six-Day War, tensions between Salah Jadid and Hafez al-Assad increased, and al-Assad and his associates were strengthened by their hold on the military. In late 1968,[19] they began dismantling Jadid's support network, facing ineffectual resistance from the civilian branch of the party that remained under Jadid's control.[20] This duality of power persisted until the Corrective Revolution of November 1970, when al-Assad ousted and imprisoned Atassi and Jadid.[21] He then set upon a project of rapid institution-building, reopened parliament and adopted a permanent constitution for the country, which had been ruled by military fiat and a provisional constitutional documents since 1963.[21] Assad significantly modified his predecessor's radical socialist economic policies, encouraged several wealthy urban families to increase their activities in the private sector, and allowed limited foreign investment from Arab countries in the Persian Gulf region States.[22]
Yom Kippur war
Hafez al-Assad's reign was marked by the virtual abandonment of Pan-Arab ideology; replacing it with the doctrine of socialist transformation and giving overriding priority in constructing socialist society within Syria.[23] Political participation was limited to the National Progressive Front, the ruling coalition of Syrian Baath and Marxist–Leninist parties; entrenching itself firmly within the Soviet Bloc. The Party also began building a personality cult around Assad and brought the elite of the armed forces under Assad's grip and the officer corps were installed with Alawite loyalists, further alienating the Sunni majority from the party.[24] When Hafez al-Assad came to power in 1971, the army began to modernize and change. In the first 10 years of Assad's rule, the army increased by 162%, and by 264% by 2000. At one point, 70% of the country's GDP went only to the army. On 6 October 1973, Syria and Egypt initiated the Yom Kippur War against Israel. The Israel Defense Forces reversed the initial Syrian gains and pushed deeper into Syrian territory. The village of Quneitra was largely destroyed by the Israeli army.[25]
Islamist uprising in Syria
By the late 1970s, the state apparatus of the neo-Ba'athist regime under Assad had consolidated into an anti-Sunni orientation. Official propaganda incited Alawite farmers against rich Sunni landowners and regularly disseminated stereotypes of Sunni merchants and industrialists, casting them as enemies of nationalization and socialist revolution. Bitterness towards the Assadist regime and the Alawite elite in the neo-Ba'ath and armed forces became widespread amongst the Sunni majority, laying the beginnings of an Islamic resistance. Prominent leaders of Muslim Brotherhood like Issam al-Attar were imprisoned and exiled. A coalition of the traditional Syrian Sunni ulema, Muslim Brotherhood revolutionaries and Islamist activists formed the Syrian Islamic Front in 1980 with objective of overthrowing Assad through Jihad and establishing an Islamic state. In the same year, Hafez officially supported Iran in its war with Iraq and controversially began importing Iranian fighters and terror groups into Lebanon and Syria. This led to rising social tensions within the country which eventually became a full-fledged Islamist rebellion in 1982; led by the Islamic Front. The regime responded by slaughtering the Sunni inhabitants in Hama and Aleppo and bombarding numerous mosques, killing around 20,000–40,000 civilians. The uprising was brutally crushed and Assad regarded the Muslim Brethren as demolished.[26]
Soviet alliance
Syria under Hafez al-Assad was a staunch Soviet ally and firmly aligned itself with Soviet Bloc during the height of the Cold War. Soviet Union saw Syria as the lynchpin of its Middle-East strategy and signed the Treaty of Friendship and Co-operation in 1980; directly committing itself to Syria's defense and incorporating the Syrian armed forces into Soviet standards. For his part, Hafez committed himself to socialist economic and foreign policies; and was one of the few autocrats to openly support the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan. The end of the Cold War and collapse of the Soviet Union dealt a deep blow to Assad, who retained the nostalgia for the old order.[27][28] Assad continued to rule Syria until his death in 2000, by centralizing powers in the state presidency.[29]
Syrian occupation of Lebanon
Syria was invited into Lebanon by its president, Suleiman Frangieh, in 1976, to intervene on the side of the Lebanese government against Palestine Liberation Organization guerilla fighters and Lebanese Maronite forces amid the Lebanese Civil War. The Arab Deterrent Force originally consisted of a Syrian core, up to 25,000 troops, with participation by some other Arab League states totaling only around 5,000 troops.[30][31][32] In late 1978, after the Arab League had extended the mandate of the Arab Deterrent Force, the Sudanese, the Saudis and the United Arab Emirates announced intentions to withdraw troops from Lebanon, extending their stay into the early months of 1979 at the Lebanese government's request.[33] The Libyan troops were essentially abandoned and had to find their own way home, and the ADF thereby became a purely Syrian force, although it did include the Palestine Liberation Army.[34] A year after Israel invaded and occupied Southern Lebanon during the 1982 Lebanon War, the Lebanese government failed to extend the ADF's mandate, thereby effectively ending its existence, although not the Syrian or Israeli military presence in Lebanon.[35] Eventually the Syrian presence became known as the Syrian occupation of Lebanon.
Syrian forces lingered in Lebanon throughout the civil war in Lebanon, eventually bringing most of the nation under Syrian control as part of a power struggle with Israel, which had occupied areas of southern Lebanon in 1978. In 1985, Israel began to withdraw from Lebanon, as a result of domestic opposition in Israel and international pressure.[36] In the aftermath of this withdrawal, the War of the Camps broke out, with Syria fighting their former Palestinian allies. The Syrian occupation of Lebanon continued until 2005.[37]
Diplomatic efforts
In a major shift in relations with both other Arab states and the Western world, Syria participated in the United States-led Gulf War against Saddam Hussein. The country participated in the multilateral Madrid Conference of 1991, and during the 1990s engaged in negotiations with Israel along with Palestine and Jordan. These negotiations failed, and there have been no further direct Syrian-Israeli talks since President Hafiz al-Assad's meeting with then President Bill Clinton in Geneva in 2000.[38]
Bashar al-Assad's presidency
Hafez al-Assad died on 10 June 2000. His son, Bashar al-Assad, was elected president in an election in which he ran unopposed.[39] His election saw the birth of the Damascus Spring and hopes of reform, but by autumn 2001, the authorities had suppressed the movement, imprisoning some of its leading intellectuals.[40] Instead, reforms have been limited to some market reforms.[41][42][43] On 5 October 2003, Israel bombed a site near Damascus, claiming it was a terrorist training facility for members of Islamic Jihad.[44] In March 2004, Syrian Kurds and Arabs clashed in the northeastern city of al-Qamishli. Signs of rioting were seen in the cities of Qamishli and Hasakeh.[45] In 2005, Syria ended its military presence in Lebanon.[46]Assassination of Rafic Hariri in 2005 led to international condemnation and triggered a popular Intifada in Lebanon, known as "the Cedar Revolution" which forced the Assad regime to withdraw its 20,000 Syrian soldiers in Lebanon and end its 29-year-long military occupation of Lebanon.[47][48] On 6 September 2007, foreign jet fighters, suspected as Israeli, reportedly carried out Operation Orchard against a suspected nuclear reactor under construction by North Korean technicians.[49]
Syrian civil war
The Syrian civil war began in 2011 as a part of the wider Arab Spring, a wave of upheaval throughout the Arab World. Public demonstrations across Syria began on 26 January 2011 and developed into a nationwide uprising. Protesters demanded the resignation of President Bashar al-Assad, the overthrow of his government, and an end to nearly five decades of Ba’ath Party rule. Since spring 2011, the Syrian government deployed the Syrian Army to quell the uprising, and several cities were besieged,[50][51] though the unrest continued. According to some witnesses, soldiers, who refused to open fire on civilians, were summarily executed by the Syrian Army.[52] The Syrian government denied reports of defections, and blamed armed gangs for causing trouble.[53] Since early autumn 2011, civilians and army defectors began forming fighting units, which began an insurgency campaign against the Syrian Army. The insurgents unified under the banner of the Free Syrian Army and fought in an increasingly organized fashion; however, the civilian component of the armed opposition lacked an organized leadership.[54]
The uprising has sectarian undertones, though neither faction in the conflict has described sectarianism as playing a major role. The opposition is dominated by Sunni Muslims, whereas the leading government figures are Alawites,[55] affiliated with Shia Islam. As a result, the opposition is winning support from the Sunni Muslim states, whereas the government is publicly supported by the Shia dominated Iran and the Lebanese Hezbollah. According to various sources, including the United Nations, up to 13,470–19,220 people have been killed, of which about half were civilians, but also including 6,035–6,570 armed combatants from both sides[56][57][58][59] and up to 1,400 opposition protesters.[60] Many more have been injured, and tens of thousands of protesters have been imprisoned. According to the Syrian government, 9,815–10,146 people, including 3,430 members of the security forces, 2,805–3,140 insurgents and up to 3,600 civilians, have been killed in fighting with what they characterize as "armed terrorist groups."[61] To escape the violence, tens of thousands of Syrian refugees have fled the country to neighboring Jordan, Iraq and Lebanon,[62] as well to Turkey.[63] The total official UN numbers of Syrian refugees reached 42,000 at the time,[64] while unofficial number stood at as many as 130,000.
Government collapse and insurgency
On 27 November 2024, violence flared up once again. Rebel factions, led by the Islamist group Hayat Tahrir al-Sham (HTS) and the Turkish-backed Syrian National Army (SNA), had taken control of Aleppo, prompting a retaliatory airstrike campaign by Syrian President Bashar al-Assad, supported by Russia. The strikes, which targeted population centers and several hospitals in rebel-held city of Idlib, resulted in at least 25 deaths, according to the White Helmets rescue group. The NATO countries issued a joint statement calling for the protection of civilians and critical infrastructure to prevent further displacement and ensure humanitarian access. They stressed the urgent need for a Syrian-led political solution, in accordance with UN Security Council Resolution 2254, which advocates for dialogue between the Syrian government and opposition forces. The rebel offensive, which had begun on 27 November 2024, continued its advance into Hama Province following their capture of Aleppo.[65][66][67] The government of Bashar al-Assad was overthrown on 8 December 2024 after the capture of Damascus by the Syrian opposition.[68] The Baath party suspended its activities in Syria after Islamist-led rebel forces toppled Assad's government.[69]
Cavoški, Jovan (2022). Non-Aligned Movement Summits: A History. UK: Bloomsburry. p. 101. ISBN978-1-3500-3209-5. Syria, headed by the radical leftist Baath Party overtly challenged Nasser's leadership credentials by highlighting his diminished revolutionary spirit.
I. Dawisha, Adeed (1980). "3: External and Internal Setting". Syria and the Lebanese Crisis. London, UK: Macmillan Press Ltd. p. 45. ISBN978-1-349-05373-5. The change has been particularly marked under Asad. He has created a fairly popular Presidential regime: radical left, the most advanced socialist regime in the Arab world, it is progressively widening the frame to include more peasants and labourers.
The Israel Economist. Vol. 26–27. University of Minnesota: Kollek & Son, Limited. 1970. p. 61. The ideology propounded by the Ba'ath changed completely. The accent on Arab nationalism was discarded as was moderate socialism. Their place was taken by Syrian nationalism and extreme left-wing ideas verging on communism.
Abadi, Jacob (2004). Israel's Quest for Recognition and Acceptance in Asia: Garrison State Diplomacy. London, UK: Frank Class Publishers. p. 22. ISBN0-7146-5576-7. radical left-wing Ba'ath party in Syria.
S. Abu Jaber, Kamel (1966). The Arab Ba'th Socialist Party: History, Ideology and Organization. Syracuse, New York, USA: Syracuse University Press. pp. xii–xiii, 33–47, 75–97. LCCN66-25181. The leadership now in control of Syria does not represent the gamut of the Ba'th party. It is composed mainly of extreme leftists vesting almost exclusive authority in the military wing of the party.
Hopwood, Derek (2013). Syria 1945–1986: Politics and Society. Routledge. pp. 45–46, 73–75, 90. doi:10.4324/9781315818955. ISBN9781317818427. The period 1963 to 1970 when Asad finally succeeded was marked ideologically by uncertainty and even turbulence. It was a period of transition from the old nationalist politicians to the radical socialist Baathis... struggle between 'moderates' and radicals was centred on the dispute whether to impose a radical left wing government and a social revolution on Syria or to follow a more moderate Arab unionist course which would possibly appease opponents of the Baath. The radicals largely held the upper hand and worked to strengthen the control of the party over the state.
Mikhaĭlovich Vasil'ev, Alekseĭ (1993). Russian Policy in the Middle East: From Messianism to Pragmatism. University of Michigan, USA: Ithaca Press. pp. 63, 76. ISBN978-0863721687. Syrian Baathist version of Arab nationalism and socialism offered plenty of points of contact with Soviet policy... when the left-wing Baathist faction led by Nureddin Atasi came to power, accelerated Syria's rapprochement with the Soviet Union... for the USSR Syria remained an uneasy ally whose actions were beyond control, often unpredictable and the cause of complications. The ultra-leftist slogans originating from Damascus (such as a 'people's war') were not received enthusiastically in Moscow. Mustafa Tlas, the new Syrian chief of staff, was a theoretician of guerrilla warfare and had even translated works by Che Guevara who was not particularly popular among the Soviet leaders.
^Meininghaus, Esther (2016). "Introduction". Creating Consent in Ba'thist Syria: Women and Welfare in a Totalitarian State. I. B. Tauris. pp. 1–33. ISBN978-1-78453-115-7.
^Korany, Bahgat; Dessouki, Ali (2010-07-15), The Foreign Policies of Arab States: The Challenge of Globalization, American University in Cairo Press, pp. 423–424, ISBN978-977-416-360-9
^Dam, Nikolaos van (2011). 10: Conclusions: The struggle for power in Syria: politics and society under Asad and the Ba'th Party (4 ed.). London: I. B. Tauris. ISBN978-1-84885-760-5.
^ abPipes, Daniel (1992). Greater Syria: the history of an ambition. Oxford University paperback. New York: Oxford Univ. Pr. p. 158. ISBN978-0-19-506022-5.
^Roberts, David (2015). "13: Conclusions". The Ba'ath and the creation of modern Syria (Routledge Library Editions: Syria ed.). Abingdon, Oxon: Routledge. pp. 136–139. ISBN978-0-415-83882-5.
^F. Devlin, John (1976). "16: Military Ascendancy in Syria". The Baath Party: A History From its Origins to 1966. Stanford University, California: Hoover Institution Press. pp. 281–307. ISBN978-0817965617.
^Pierret, Thomas (2013). "4: The State Management of religion in Syria". In Heydemann, Steven; Leenders, Reinoud (eds.). Middle East Authoritarianisms: Governance, Contestation and regime resilience in Syria and Iran. Stanford, California, USA: Stanford University Press. pp. 86–89. ISBN978-0-8047-8301-9.
^Pierret, Thomas (2013). "4: The State Management of Religion in Syria". In Heydemann, Steven; Leenders, Reinoud (eds.). Middle East Authoritarianisms: Governance, Contestation and regime resilience in Syria and Iran. Stanford, California, USA: Stanford University Press. pp. 89–94. ISBN978-0-8047-8301-9.
^Viorst, Milton (1994). Sandcastles: the Arabs in search of the modern world. Syracuse University Press. p. 146. ISBN978-0224033237.
^S. Abu Jaber, Kamel (1966). The Arab Ba'th Socialist Party: History, Ideology and Organization (1st ed.). Syracuse, New York, USA: Syracuse University Press. pp. xii–xiii, 76–78, 93–95. LCCN66-25181.
^Seale 1990, p. 142. sfn error: no target: CITEREFSeale1990 (help)
^Seale 1990, pp. 149–150. sfn error: no target: CITEREFSeale1990 (help)
^Roberts, David (2015). The Ba'ath and the creation of modern Syria (Routledge Library Editions: Syria ed.). Abingdon, Oxon: Routledge. pp. 53, 106–108. ISBN978-0-415-83882-5.
^Roberts, David (2015). "12: Hafiz al-Asad - II". The Ba'ath and the creation of modern Syria (Routledge Library Editions: Syria ed.). Abingdon, Oxon: Routledge. pp. 114–117, 119–121. ISBN978-0-415-83882-5.
^Pipes, Daniel (1995). "1: Assad's Post-Soviet Predicament". Syria Beyond the Peace Process. Washington Institute for Near East Policy. pp. 6–8. ISBN0-944029-64-7.