In the philosophical subdiscipline of ontology, animalism is a theory of personal identity that asserts that humans are animals.[1] The concept of animalism is advocated by philosophers Eric T. Olson, Peter van Inwagen, Paul Snowdon, Stephan Blatti, David Hershenov and David Wiggins.[2][page needed] The view stands in contrast to positions such as John Locke's psychological criterion for personal identity or various forms of mind–body dualism, such as Richard Swinburne's account.
A common argument for animalism is known as the thinking-animal argument. It asserts the following:[3]
A less common, but perhaps increasing, use of the term animalism is to refer to the ethical view that all or most animals are worthy of moral consideration.[4] It may be similar, though not necessarily, to sentientism.
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