The Bar Confederation (Polish: Konfederacja barska; 1768–1772) was an association of Polish–Lithuanian nobles (szlachta) formed at the fortress of Bar in Podolia (now Ukraine), in 1768 to defend the internal and external independence of the Polish–Lithuanian Commonwealth against Russian political influence and against King Stanislaus II Augustus with Polish reformers, who were attempting to limit the power of the Commonwealth's wealthy magnates.[4]
At the end of the Seven Years' War (1756–1763), Russia, first allied with Austria and France, had decided to support Prussia, allowing a victory of the Prussians (allied with Great Britain) over the Austrians (allied with France).
Neither France nor Austria were able to challenge this candidate and Stanislas was elected in October 1764.
In the Commonwealth
Early 18th-century Polish–Lithuanian Commonwealth had declined from the status of a major European power to that of a Russian satellite state, with the Russian tsar effectively choosing Polish–Lithuanian monarchs during the "free" elections and deciding the direction of much of Poland–Lithuania's internal politics, for example during the Repnin Sejm (1767–1768), named after the Russian ambassador who unofficially presided over the proceedings.[6][7]
During this session, the Polish–Lithuanian parliament was forced to pass resolutions demanded by the Russians. Many of the conservative nobility felt anger at that foreign interference, at the perceived weakness of the government under king Stanislaus Augustus, and at the provisions, particularly the ones that empowered non-Catholics, and at other reforms which they saw as threatening the szlachta's Golden Liberty.[8][9]
The protectorate of Russia over Poland–Lithuania became official with the Traktat wieczystej przyjaźni pomiędzy Rosją a Rzecząpospolitą (lit.'Treaty of perpetual friendship between Russia and the Commonwealth'[10]) which the Repnin Sejm accepted without debate on 27 February 1768.
Creation of the Bar Confederation (29 February 1768)
The confederation, encouraged and aided by Roman Catholic France and Austria, declared a war on Russia.[9] Its irregular forces, formed from volunteers, magnate militias and deserters from the royal army, soon clashed with the Russian troops and units loyal to the Polish crown.[9] Confederation forces under Michał Jan Pac and Prince Karol Stanisław Radziwiłł roamed the land in every direction, won several engagements with the Russians, and at last, utterly ignoring the King, sent envoys on their own account to the principal European powers, i.e. Ottoman Empire, the major ally of Bar confederation, France and Austria.
King Stanislaus Augustus was at first inclined to mediate between the Confederates and Russia, the latter represented by the Russian envoy to Warsaw, Prince Nikolai Repnin; but finding this impossible, he sent a force against them under Grand HetmanFranciszek Ksawery Branicki and two generals against the confederates. This marked the Ukrainian campaign, which lasted from April till June 1768, and was ended with the capture of Bar on 20 June.[9] Confederation forces retreated to Moldavia.[9] There was also a pro-Confederation force in Lesser Poland, that operated from June till August, that ended with the royal forces securing Kraków on 22 August, followed by a period of conflict in Belarus (August–October), that ended with the surrender of Nesvizh on 26 October.[9]
The simultaneous outbreak of the Koliivshchyna in Ukraine (May 1768 – June 1769) made major confederation forces retreat to Ottoman Empire beforehand and kept the Confederation alive.
The Confederates appealed for help from abroad and contributed to bringing about war between Russia and the Ottoman Empire (the Russo-Turkish War (1768–1774) that began in September).
1769–1770
The retreat of some Russian forces needed on the Ottoman front bolstered the confederates, who reappeared in force in Lesser and Greater Polands by 1769.[9] In 1770 the Council of Bar Confederation transferred from its original seat in Austrian part of Silesia to Hungary, whence it conducted diplomatic negotiations with France, Austria and Turkey with a view to forming a stable league against Russia. The council proclaimed the king dethroned on 22 October 1770. The court of Versailles sent Charles François Dumouriez to act as an aid to the Confederates, and he helped them to organize their forces.[9] He fortified several fortresses around Kraków (Tyniec, Lanckorona, Częstochowa) and formed a Confederate infantry detachment to protect the warehouses in Podolia.[12]
The Confederates began operating in Lithuania, although after early successes that direction too met with failures, with defeats at Białystok on 16 July and Orzechowo on 13 September 1769.[9] Early 1770 saw the defeats of confederates in Greater Poland, after the battle of Dobra (20 January) and Błonie (12 February), which forced them into a mostly defensive, passive stance.[9]
An attempt of Bar Confederates (including Casimir Pulaski[13]) to kidnap king Stanislaus II Augustus on 3 November 1771 led the Habsburgs to withdraw their support from the confederates, expelling them from their territories.[14] It also gave the three courts another pretext to showcase the "Polish anarchy" and the need for its neighbors to step in and "save" the country and its citizens.[9][15] The king thereupon reverted to the Russian faction, and for the attempt of kidnapping their king, the Confederation lost much of the support it had in Europe.[14]
1771–1772
Its army, thoroughly reorganized by Dumouriez, maintained the fight. 1771 brought further defeats, with the defeat at Lanckorona on 21 May and Stałowicze at 23 October.[9] The final battle of the war was the siege of Jasna Góra, which fell on 13 August 1772.[9] The regiments of the Bar Confederation, whose executive board had been forced to leave Austria, which previously supported them, after Austria joined the Prusso-Russian alliance, did not lay down their arms.[16]
Many fortresses in their command held out as long as possible; Wawel Castle (defended by Marquis de Choisy) in Kraków fell only on 28 April;[17][18]Tyniec fortress held until 13 July 1772;[19]Częstochowa, commanded by Casimir Pulaski, held until 18 August.[17][20] Overall, around 100,000 nobles participated in 500 military clashes in 1768–1772.[2] Perhaps the last stronghold of the confederates was in the monastery in Zagórz, which fell only on 28 November 1772. In the end, the Bar Confederation was defeated, with its members either fleeing abroad or being deported to Siberia, Volga region, Urals by the Russians.[16]
In the meantime, taking advantage of the confusion in the Commonwealth, already by 1769–71, both Austria and Prussia had taken over some of its border territories, with Austria taking Szepes County in 1769–1770 and Prussia incorporating Lauenburg and Bütow.[21] On 19 February 1772, the agreement of partition was signed in Vienna.[17] A previous secret agreement between Prussia and Russia had been made in Saint Petersburg on 6 February 1772.[17]
Early in August, Russian, Prussian, and Austrian troops fighting the Bar confederation in the Commonwealth occupied the provinces agreed upon among themselves. On 5 August, the three parties issued a manifesto about their respective territorial gains on the Commonwealth's expense.[22]
Bar Confederates taken as prisoners by the Russians, together with their families, formed the first major group of Poles and Lithuanians exiled to Siberia (sybirak).[16] It is estimated that about 5,000 former confederates were sent there.[9]Russians organized 3 concentration camps in Polish–Lithuanian Commonwealth for Polish captives, where these concentrated persons have been waiting for their deportation there.[23]
International situation after the defeat of Bar confederation and its Ottoman allies
Around mid-18th century the European balance of power shifted, with Russian victories against the Ottomans in the Russo-Turkish War (1768–1774) strengthening Russia and endangering Habsburg interests in that region (particularly in Moldavia and Wallachia). At that point Habsburg Austria started to consider waging a war against Russia.[22][24] France, friendly towards both Prussia and Austria, suggested a series of territorial adjustments, in which Austria would be compensated by parts of Prussian Silesia, and Prussia in turn would receive Polish Ermland (Warmia) and parts of the Polish fief, Duchy of Courland and Semigallia – already under Baltic German hegemony.[22]
King Frederick II of Prussia had no intention of giving up Silesia gained recently in the Silesian Wars. He was interested in finding a peaceful solution – his alliance with Russia would draw him into a potential war with Austria, and the Seven Years' War had left Austria's treasury and army weakened.[citation needed] He was also interested in protecting the weakening Ottoman Empire, which could be advantageously utilized in the event of a Prussian war either with Russia or Austria. Frederick's brother, Prince Henry, spent the winter of 1770–71 as a representative of the Prussian court at Saint Petersburg.[22]
As Austria had annexed 13 towns in the Hungarian Szepes county in 1769, violating the Treaty of Lubowla, Catherine II of Russia and her advisor General Ivan Chernyshyov suggested to Henry that Prussia claim some Polish land, such as Ermland. After Henry informed him of the proposal, Frederick suggested a partition of the Polish borderlands by Austria, Prussia, and Russia, with the largest share going to Austria. Thus Frederick attempted to encourage Russia to direct its expansion towards weak and non-functional Polish–Lithuanian Commonwealth instead of the Ottomans.[22]
Russia considered the weak Poland–Lithuania as its protectorate for a few decades already since the Silent Sejm.[6] Poland–Lithuania was devastated by a civil war in which the Bar Confederation's forces attempted to disrupt Russian control.[22] The recent Koliivshchyna peasant and Cossack uprising in Ukraine also weakened Polish–Lithuanian position. Further, the Russian-supported king of Poland, Stanislaus Augustus, was seen as both weak and too independent-minded. Eventually the Russian court decided that Poland–Lithuania's usefulness as a protectorate had lessened.[21] The three powers officially justified their actions as compensation for dealing with troublesome neighbor and restoring order to Polish anarchy, for which the Bar Confederation provided a convenient excuse. All three were interested in territorial gains.[25]
After Russia occupied the Danubian Principalities, Henry convinced Frederick and Archduchess Maria Theresa of Austria that the balance of power would be maintained by a tripartite division of the Polish–Lithuanian Commonwealth instead of Russia taking land from the Ottomans. Under pressure from Prussia, which for a long time wanted to annex the northern Polish province of Royal Prussia, the three powers agreed on the First Partition of Poland–Lithuania. This was in light of the possible Austrian-Ottoman-Bar confederation alliance[17] with only token objections from Austria,[21] which would have instead preferred to receive more Ottoman territories in the Balkans, a region which for a long time had been coveted by the Habsburgs, including Bukovina. The Russians also withdrew from Moldavia and Wallachia away from the Austrian border.
Legacy
Until the times of the Bar Confederation, confederates – especially operating with the aid of outside forces – were seen as unpatriotic antagonists.[26] But in 1770s, during the times that the Imperial Russian Army marched through the theoretically independent Commonwealth, and foreign powers forced the Sejm to agree to the First Partition of Poland–Lithuania, the confederates started to create an image of Polish exiled soldiers, the last of those who remained true to their Motherland, an image that would in the next two centuries lead to the creation of Polish Legions and other forces in exile.[26]
The Confederation has generated varying assessments from the historians. All admit its patriotic desire to free the Commonwealth from outside (primarily-Russian) influence. Some, such as Jacek Jędruch, criticise its regressive stance on civil rights issues, primarily with regards to religious tolerance (Jędruch writes of "religious bigotry" and a "narrowly Catholic" stance), and assert that to have contributed to the First Partition.[4][8] Others, such as Bohdan Urbankowski, applaud it as the first serious national military effort to restore Polish independence.[26]
^ abPetrushevsky, Alexander (1884). Generalissimo Prince Suvorov (in Russian). Vol. 1 (1st ed.). Типография М. М. Стасюлевича. pp. 101–102.
^ abLieven, Dominic, ed. (2006). The Cambridge History of Russia: Volume 2, Imperial Russia, 1689–1917. Cambridge University Press. p. 171. ISBN9780521815291. His [Stanisław Poniatowski] victory heralded both reform and Russian influence, both of which were inimical to the conservative Polish–Lithuanian nobles united in the Confederation of Bar. About 100,000 nobles fought 500 engagements between 1768 and their final defeat in 1772
^Skinner, Barbara (2009). "Khmelnytsky's shadow: The confessional legacy.". In Friedrich, Karin; Pendzich, Barbara (eds.). Citizenship and Identity in a Multinational Commonwealth Poland-Lithuania in Context, 1550–1772. Brill. p. 165. ISBN978-90-04-16983-8. The pro-Catholic Confederation of Bar embroiled some 150,000 participants in a dogged four-year struggle against Russian interference in Commonwealth affairs that plunged Poland-Lithuania into the chaos of civil war.
^ abc"Confederation of Bar". Encyclopædia Britannica. Retrieved 29 April 2010. Its activities precipitated a civil war, foreign intervention, and the First Partition of Poland.
^ abcUrbankowskipl, Bohdan (1997). Józef Piłsudski: marzyciel i strateg [Józef Piłsudski: Dreamer and Strategist] (in Polish). Warsaw: Wydawnictwo ALFA. p. 155. ISBN978-83-7001-914-3.
Aleksander Kraushar, Książę Repnin i Polska w pierwszem czteroleciu panowania Stanisława Augusta (1764–1768), (Prince Repin and Poland in the first four years of rule of Stanislaw August (1764–1768))
2nd edition, corrected and expanded. vols. 1–2, Kraków 1898, G. Gebethner i Sp.
Revised edition, Warszawa: Gebethner i Wolff; Kraków: G. Gebethner i Spółka, 1900.
F. A. Thesby de Belcour, The Confederates of Bar (in Polish) (Cracow, 1895)
Charles Francois Dumouriez, Mémoires et correspondance (Paris, 1834).