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It does not seem Wikipedian to give two paragraphs to one person's criticism of a hash.
What Urban's saying also misunderstands the attack SipHash is protecting against. The threat is the attacker figures out an efficient, non-brute-force way to generate a lot of values that will all fall into the same hash bucket, so that each lookup has to traverse a lot of data (in linked lists or by whatever manner). SipHash helps not because it prevents a random collision from being found, but because the secret key keeps the attacker from achieving a better-than-random chance of collision for the next value to add to the hashtable, even if they can directly observe hash values (or indirectly observe them through timing). Obviously WP can't just take my word; it'd take a good source saying this to include it.
The claim on the source page that SHA-1 with output truncated is solvable with "Z3" also does not make sense. Truncating SHA1's output doesn't reduce the internal complexity of the function the solver has to deal with; he might be confused between truncated output and reduced rounds.
But all of that seems kind of to the side. If I fork and improve a hash benchmarking project and put some security stuff on a page, I'm still not a security expert, however strident I am about things. Again, not how WP works. — Preceding unsigned comment added by 76.103.246.130 (talk) 05:03, 10 January 2017 (UTC)
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