Palestinian internal political violence has existed throughout the course of the Israeli–Palestinian conflict, notwithstanding the fact that the vast majority of Palestinian political violence has been directed against Israeli targets. Some analysts have referred to this type of violence as an "'intrafada", a play on "intifada".[1][2][3]
Amin al-Husseini, head of the Arab Higher Committee, came into conflict with the more moderate Nashishibi family, which supported the partition of Palestine into two states, Jewish and Palestinian Arab. This rift produced significant violence, including the abductions of British-backed local village chiefs and the assassinations of suspected collaborators.[3] Despite shared adherence to the Palestinian cause by both local Muslims and Christians,[4][5][6] there were cases of Muslim radicals coordinating attacks against Christians, as well as against local Druze.[3] Overall, 10% of Palestinian deaths during the revolt were from intra-Palestinian violence.[3]
In 1985, the pro-Syrian factions formed the Palestinian National Salvation Front (PNSF), based in Mar Elias, a Palestinian Christian refugee camp.[12][13] The PNSF joined the Amal Movement in fighting the PLO in the Palestinian refugee camps of southern Lebanon and west Beirut, in what was called the "War of the Camps" subconflict.
The fighting in west Beirut ended in April 1987 with the arrival of Syrian forces to the area; in the south, the fighting ended in a stalemate.[14] Ultimately, the Lebanese government estimates that some 2500 Palestinians, both combatants and non-combatants, were killed during the War of the Camps, but the real number is likely higher.[15]
First Intifada
About one-fifth of the 730 attacks during the first four months of the First Intifada were the result of intra-Palestinian political violence. What has been described as a wave of "paranoia" swept the occupied Palestinian territories, leading to the mass killings of suspected collaborators with Israel.[3]
By June 1990, according to Benny Morris, "[T]he Intifada seemed to have lost direction. A symptom of the PLO's frustration was the great increase in the killing of suspected collaborators."[16] Roughly 18,000 Palestinians, compromised by Israeli intelligence, are said to have given information to the other side.[17] Collaborators were threatened with death or ostracism unless they desisted, and if their collaboration with the occupying power continued, were executed by special troops such as the "Black Panthers" and "Red Eagles". An estimated 771 (according to the Associated Press) to 942 (according to the IDF) Palestinians were executed on suspicion of collaboration during the span of the Intifada.[18]
As a result of the Oslo Accords between the PLO and Israel, the Palestinian Authority (PA) was formed in 1994, as a compromise, to exercise limited governance in the Palestinian territories. After the Oslo Accords, and with the failure to establish an actual independent Palestinian state, "strong feelings of betrayal and futility" arose among many Palestinians.[1]
Second Intifada
The Second Intifada involved direct fighting between the forces of Israel and those of the Palestinian Authority.
A January 2003 Humanist magazine article reported:[19]
For over a decade the PA has violated Palestinian human rights and civil liberties by routinely killing civilians—including collaborators, demonstrators, journalists, and others—without charge or fair trial. Of the total number of Palestinian civilians killed during this period by both Israeli and Palestinian security forces, 16 percent were the victims of Palestinian security forces.
... According to Freedom House's annual survey of political rights and civil liberties, Freedom in the World 2001–2002, the chaotic nature of the Intifada along with strong Israeli reprisals has resulted in a deterioration of living conditions for Palestinians in Israeli-administered areas. The survey states:
"Civil liberties declined due to: shooting deaths of Palestinian civilians by Palestinian security personnel; the summary trial and executions of alleged collaborators by the Palestinian Authority (PA); extrajudicial killings of suspected collaborators by militias; and the apparent official encouragement of Palestinian youth to confront Israeli soldiers, thus placing them directly in harm's way."
The Hamas victory in the election on 25 January 2006 was followed by the formation of a new PA government by leader Ismail Haniyeh. This government suffered from political paralysis, due to lack of cooperation from Fatah,[24] and from severe diplomatic isolation due to Hamas' refusal to commit to nonviolence and recognize Israel.[25] Several instances of clashes and assassinations of leaders from both sides exacerbated the tense situation.[23] By October 2006, the United States, Israel, many Arab governments, and most of Abbas's key advisors held the view that Hamas had to be forced out of power if it did not change its positions.[26] Following the Saudi-brokered Fatah–Hamas Mecca agreement, the Hamas government was briefly replaced by a unity government in March 2007 in an effort to end the crippling diplomatic isolation.[27]
Armed clashes between the two sides became increasingly frequent; finally, in June 2007, Hamas wrestled control of the Gaza Strip from Fatah in a 5-day battle and the government split. There were allegations that Fatah was preparing a coup to oust Hamas, and that the Hamas actions were preemptive.[28][29][30] The Hamas takeover of the Gaza Strip resulted in Abbas' dissolution of the unity government[31] and the replacement of the PA in the territory with Hamas rule by 15 June.[32][33] Hamas was unable to seize power in the West Bank, however, as the Al-Aqsa Martyrs' Brigades– at that time the official Fatah armed wing– stormed the parliamentary building in Ramallah.[34]
In early 2009, there was a wave of political violence perpetuated by the Hamas administration in the Gaza Strip. A series of violent acts, ranging from physical assaults, torture, and executions of Palestinians suspected of collaboration with the Israel Defense Forces, as well as members of the Fatah political party, occurred. According to Human Rights Watch, at least 32 people were killed by these attacks: 18 during the conflict and 14 afterward, and several dozen more were maimed, many by shots to the legs.[35][36]
In May 2009, Hamas militants clashed with PA security forces in Qalqilya, West Bank. In 2014, the Shin Bet revealed an alleged plot by Hamas to depose Fatah in the West Bank. This would be achieved by deploying Hamas cells around the West Bank to incite a third intifada and overwhelm Palestinian Authority forces. More than 90 people were arrested. President Abbas said the plot was "a grave threat to the unity of the Palestinian people and its future."[37]
During the ongoing Israel–Hamas war (2023–present), Hamas accused Fatah of sending security officers into northern Gaza in collaboration with Israel, saying it had arrested six individuals and were "in pursuit" of the others. The Palestinian Authority issued a statement refuting the claims by Hamas.[38]
In the West Bank, various local Palestinian militias have been engaged in an armed conflict with the PA.
The conflict began with a "proliferation" of armed groups in the West Bank from 2021 to 2022 as a result of the weakness and complicity of the PA in the Israeli occupation as well as several other factors including the 2021 Israel–Palestine crisis.[20][39][40][41]
The PA has had a shared interest with Israel in suppressing militants.[42] Cooperation between the PA security forces and the IDF is reflected by the fact that the former have simply remained in their barracks during IDF raids[43][44] and have actively interfered with militants' defenses against those raids.[22][45][46][47]
During the Israel–Hamas war, the rate of clashes has increased. The July 2024 West Bank unrest directed against the Palestinian Authority was a major escalation in the conflict,[48] sparked by the alleged arrest attempt of "Abu Shujaa", the leader of the Tulkarm Brigade, on 26 July. Protestors and militants clashed with security forces in Tulkarm,[49][50][51] Jenin,[52][53][54][55] Bethlehem,[56][57] Tubas,[56] and Nablus.[55] By August, the unrest had been "contained", according to Tulkarm officials.[52]
^Kayyali, Abdul-Wahhab Said (1981). Palestine: A Modern History. Croom Helm. ISBN086199-007-2.
^Cohen, Hillel (2008). Army of shadows: Palestinian collaboration with Zionism, 1917 - 1948. Berkeley, Calif.: Univ. of California Press. ISBN978-0-520-25989-8.
^Laura Robson, Colonialism and Christianity in Mandate Palestine, University of Texas Press, 2011 p. 159
^Parkinson, Sarah E. (2023). "The Face of the Camps". Beyond the Lines: Social Networks and Palestinian Militant Organizations in Wartime Lebanon. Cornell University Press.
