For conspicuous gallantry and able leadership on 17th October, 1918, when the enemy position south-east of Vaux Andigny was attacked. He led his company under severe fire from Bellevue Ridge on the left flank, and later collected scattered parties of men and reorganised the line until the left flank had been cleared. He was largely responsible for organising a second attack on the village of Andigny les Fermes, which was strongly held. This attack was successful.[14]
After graduating from Camberley in December 1931 he served, from November 1932, as a General Staff Officer (GSO) for Physical Training with Aldershot Command,[21] and was promoted to brevet major in early January 1936.[22] In February 1935 he then became a brigade major with the 13th Infantry Brigade, then commanded by BrigadierJohn Priestman and was sent to Palestine during the Arab revolt there.[23][24] Relinquishing this position in February 1937,[25] to Major Manley James, one of his fellow students at Camberley, he was promoted to permanent major in August 1937.[26] From 1938 to 1940, he was Chief Instructor of the Senior Officers' School of the British Military Mission to the Egyptian Army, and was promoted to the local rank of lieutenant colonel.[27]
He retired from the army as a colonel,[34] although he had attained the rank of acting major general during his military career and most sources state he was a brigadier. He died on 7 February 1954 at Aldershot, Hampshire, at the relatively young age of 57.
Nick Smart writes that the, "rise and fall of 'Crasher' Nichols was due, no doubt, to a variety of factors. But what his wartime trajectory demonstrates was the importance of patronage in making or breaking an officer's career. An 'old desert hand', he had shown himself 'a brave and honourable soldier'. His 'failure' at Mareth may have been due to his own shortcomings, as Montgomery, by this time enraptured by his own 'left hook' success, expressed with such emphatic authority. But the alternative possibility, that too much was demanded of him and his Division and that blame for the failure of the frontal attack lay higher up the chain of command, has scarcely had an airing. Later in the war, Leese, Nichols' corps commander at Mareth, had to, as he put it, 'carry the can for Dickie (Mountbatten)'. The possibility remains that Leese withdrew his patronage from Nichols because, embarrassed by his own failure, he needed someone to carry his can."[35]
Blaxland, Gregory (1977). The Plain Cook and the Great Showman: The First and Eighth Armies in North Africa. Kimber. ISBN0-7183-0185-4.
Callahan, Raymond (2007). Churchill and His Generals. University Press of Kansas, 2007. ISBN978-070061512-4.
Converse, Alan (2011). Armies of Empire: The 9th Australian and 50th British Divisions in Battle 1939–1945. Cambridge University Press. ISBN978-0521194808.
