Kitching brought the division to Normandy where they were involved in the battle around the Falaise Pocket, in the final stages of the Battle of Normandy. According to the historian Angelo Caravaggio, Kitching was then victimized for the poor performance of the division in Normandy. Caravaggio claims that essential contemporary sources were altered after the sacking of Kitching and are therefore unreliable.[4] To him it seemed that Lieutenant-GeneralGuy Simonds, commanding II Canadian Corps, stripped his sub-commanders of authority,[5] did not take the lack of experience into account and expected unrealistic results.[6] Kitching could hardly command his own division due to the constant interference from Simonds.[7][8] Caravaggio comes to the conclusion that Kitching and his inexperienced division performed very well under the difficult circumstances and confusing orders they had to work in.[9] But the historian Antony Beevor describes Kitching as lethargic and incompetent and mentions a "lack of drive" demonstrated by the 4th Armoured.[10]
The result of the battle was that Kitching was demoted to brigadier and sent off to command a training unit. Charles Foulkes, commander of I Canadian Corps, had more confidence in his abilities and brought him in as Brigadier, General Staff. He was involved in all operations of the I Canadian Corps until the surrender of the German Forces in the Netherlands.
After the war he stayed in the military until 1965. He held in that time positions including Quartermaster General and Director General of Army Personnel. In 1956 he was promoted to major-general for the second time in his career.
N. Caravaggio, Angelo (2016). 21 Days in Normandy: Major General George Kitching and the 4th Canadian Armoured Division. Pen and Sword Books. ISBN978-1473870710.
