Draft:Repsense

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Draft:Repsense
Repsense
TypePrivate (UAB)
IndustryNarrative intelligence, data analysis, artificial intelligence
Founded2022; 4 years ago (2022) in Vilnius, Lithuania
FoundersMykolas Katkus
Alfredas Chmieliauskas
Liudvikas Andriulis
HeadquartersVilnius, Lithuania
Key people
Mykolas Katkus (CEO)
Websiterepsense.io

Repsense is a Lithuanian narrative intelligence company that develops software for analysing the spread of narratives and disinformation in news media and social media.[1] Its analyses of suspected foreign information manipulation and interference have been reported by news outlets including LRT, Bild and Le Figaro.[2][3][4]

History

Repsense was founded in 2022 in Vilnius, Lithuania.[5][6] In December 2025, the company raised a €2 million seed round led by Tensor Ventures, with participation from Seed Starter, the corporate venture arm of Česká spořitelna, BSV Ventures and Coinvest Capital.[7] The company's platform, Havel, is deployed by NATO's Strategic Communications Centre of Excellence and European government institutions.[6]

According to Le Figaro, the company's software uses artificial intelligence to trace the spread of false information from its point of origin across social media platforms, and its analyses have been used by organisations working on election integrity.[4] In a July 2026 report on Lithuania's defence posture, the Chicago Sun-Times wrote that the company's clients include the Lithuanian government and the European Parliament, and that its technology was deployed during Moldova's 2025 parliamentary elections.[8]

Analyses

Kapčiamiestis military training area

In January 2026, Repsense published an analysis of public discourse surrounding Lithuania's planned military training area near Kapčiamiestis, close to the Suwałki Gap.[8] According to LRT, the company examined about 3,500 mentions across Facebook, Telegram, TikTok and traditional media between 15 December 2025 and 7 January 2026, and reported overlaps between narratives promoted on Russian information channels and messages circulating on Lithuanian social media. The analysis found that Russia-linked Telegram and TikTok accounts began publishing critical content about the training area on 17 December, before active discussion began in Lithuanian media.[2]

Pro-Kremlin content on TikTok in Germany

In February 2026, Repsense presented a study at the Munich Security Conference on pro-Kremlin propaganda on TikTok in Germany. The analysis covered 3.1 million pieces of content on TikTok and Telegram in Germany.[9] As reported by Bild, the study found that pro-Russian narratives received greater amplification on TikTok than in German online media, and documented a pattern in which narratives originating on Russian Telegram channels were repackaged by German far-right accounts before reaching TikTok audiences. The study also identified content using coded Nazi symbolism and Soviet-era propaganda that had evaded the platform's moderation, as well as deepfake videos of fabricated conversations between heads of state.[3] Cybernews reported that content typically appeared first on Telegram, where it was coordinated, before reaching its peak audience on TikTok within the first 12 to 48 hours, with 97% of the content appearing on both platforms.[9]

2026 Hungarian parliamentary election

Repsense monitored the Hungarian information environment ahead of the 2026 Hungarian parliamentary election. According to Balkan Insight, which reviewed the company's consolidated executive report, Repsense tracked 816,863 articles and posts across Hungarian-language news sites, Facebook, X, YouTube, TikTok, Instagram and Telegram between December 2025 and April 2026. The report found that narratives aligned with Kremlin messaging were present in the campaign and were amplified mainly through official Fidesz party accounts and pro-government media, accounting for around 17 per cent of clustered TikTok posts.[10]

2026 Armenian parliamentary election

Ahead of the 2026 Armenian parliamentary election, Repsense monitored the Armenian information environment in partnership with the International Practitioners' Partnership Network (PRACTNET) and the Estonian foundation Sihtasutus Liberaalne Kodanik (SALK). According to the company's final report, the monitoring ran continuously from November 2025 to June 2026 and covered 1.8 million media items across twelve platform categories in Armenian, Russian and English, compared against a nationally representative public-opinion survey.[11] Le Figaro reported that an interim analysis by the company concluded that 58% of anti-government messages spreading on TikTok were the result of coordinated action, and identified a network of thirteen Armenian-language TikTok accounts producing most of the platform's anti-government messaging.[4] A commentary published by commonspace.eu, an analysis website managed by the LINKS Europe Foundation, cited the company's analysis of media mentions across websites, Telegram, Facebook, TikTok, Instagram, X and broadcast television during the campaign, which found that around 17.5% of analysed TikTok videos were labelled high risk for disinformation.[12]

References

  1. ^ "Repsense Secures €2 Million Seed Round". The SaaS News. 23 December 2025. Retrieved 6 August 2026.
  2. ^ a b "Analizė: viešajame diskurse dėl Kapčiamiesčio poligono pastebima rusiškų manipuliacijų". LRT (in Lithuanian). 11 January 2026. Retrieved 10 July 2026.
  3. ^ a b Hoffmann, Luca-Marie; Röpcke, Julian (13 February 2026). "Exklusive Studie belegt: Kreml-Propaganda flutet TikTok". Bild (in German). Retrieved 10 July 2026.
  4. ^ a b c Vitureau, Marielle (7 June 2026). "«Un environnement actif de manipulation et d'ingérence» : la désinformation russe à l'œuvre en Arménie". Le Figaro (in French). Retrieved 10 July 2026.
  5. ^ "Repsense, UAB". rekvizitai.vz.lt. Retrieved 10 July 2026.
  6. ^ a b Cendon Garcia, David (16 December 2025). "NATO-deployed information analytics platform Repsense raises €2 million to expand threat detection capabilities". EU-Startups. Retrieved 6 August 2026.
  7. ^ Laoun, Joy (16 December 2025). "Repsense raises €2M seed round to expand disinformation analysis platform used by NATO". Vestbee. Retrieved 10 July 2026.
  8. ^ a b Zimmermann, Stephanie (23 July 2026). "Inside Lithuania's defense strategy against Russia". Chicago Sun-Times. Retrieved 6 August 2026.
  9. ^ a b "Studie findet Millionen manipulativer Beiträge bei TikTok und Telegram". Cybernews (in German). 13 February 2026. Retrieved 6 August 2026.
  10. ^ "When Propaganda Backfires: Lessons from Orban's Social Media Defeat in Hungary Election". Balkan Insight. 4 August 2026. Retrieved 6 August 2026.
  11. ^ "Armenia Election 2026 Narrative Intelligence Report". Repsense. Retrieved 6 August 2026.
  12. ^ Ferbel-Azcarate, Santiago (12 June 2026). "Social media usage and Armenia's 2026 election". commonspace.eu. LINKS Europe Foundation. Retrieved 10 July 2026.
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