Actor–observer asymmetry

Actor–observer asymmetry (also actor–observer bias or actor–observer difference) is a bias one makes when forming attributions about the behavior of others or themselves.^[1][2][3] When people judge their own behavior, they are more likely to attribute their actions to the particular situation rather than their personality also known as a situational attribution.^[4] However, when an observer is explaining the behavior of another person, they are more likely to attribute this behavior to the actors' personality rather than situational factors, also known as dispositional attribution.^[4] For example, a politician explaining why they voted against war may say it is because the war is not needed.^[3] Whereas a person judging why the politician voted in this way may say it is because the politician is too liberal. Showing how the actor (the politician) explains their behaviour using the situation (the war), but the observer (the civilian) explains their behaviour using the politicians personality (their political standpoint).

Sometimes the actor–observer asymmetry is defined as the fundamental attribution error,^[5] which is when people tend to explain behavior on the internal, personal characteristics rather than the external factors or situational influences.^[6] However, Malle (2006) highlights that these two phenomena should be distinguished because the fundamental attribution error refers to inferring stable internal traits from behaviour, whereas actor-observer asymmetry specifically refers to explanations of behaviour.^[7]

Actor-observer asymmetry is often explained using perspectives and salience.^[8] When we are forming attributions for ourselves our perspective highlights the situation, what is occurring around us is most salient. Due to situational factors standing out to us, we may be more likely to make attributions based on that (therefore making situational attributions). Versus when we are judging someone else's behaviour, they are the focal point. What they are doing is most salient to us rather than what is occurring in the around them, which may explain more dispositional attributions. Furthermore, when we judge our own behaviour we have much more information available, such as all of the ways we have acted in the past.^[9] Whereas, when we judge other people's behaviour we have much less information available. This lack of quality information likely also contributes to differences in attributions made.

The specific hypothesis of an actor–observer asymmetry in attribution was originally proposed by Edward Jones and Richard Nisbett, where they said that "actors tend to attribute the causes of their behavior to stimuli inherent in the situation, while observers tend to attribute behavior to stable dispositions of the actor".^[10] Supported by initial evidence, the hypothesis was long held as firmly established. However, a meta-analysis of all the published tests of the hypothesis between 1971 and 2004 found that there was no actor–observer asymmetry of the sort that had been previously proposed.^[11] The author of the study interpreted this result not so much as proof that actors and observers explained behavior exactly the same way but as evidence that the original hypothesis was fundamentally flawed in the way it framed people's explanations of behavior as attributions to either stable dispositions or the situation.

Considerations of actor–observer differences can be found in other disciplines as well, such as philosophy (e.g. privileged access, incorrigibility), management studies, artificial intelligence, semiotics, anthropology, and political science.^[12]

Background and initial formulation

The background of this hypothesis was in the 1960s, with social psychology's increasing interest in the cognitive mechanisms by which people make sense of their own and other people's behavior. This interest was instigated by Fritz Heider's book, The Psychology of Interpersonal Relations, and the research in its wake has become known as "attribution research" or "attribution theory."^[13]

The specific hypothesis of an "actor–observer asymmetry" was first proposed by social psychologists Jones and Nisbett in 1971. Jones and Nisbett hypothesized that these two roles (actors and observers) produce asymmetric explanations.^[10] Their research findings were that "there is pervasive tendency for actors to attribute their actions to situational requirements, whereas observers tend to attribute the same actions to stable personal dispositions".^[10] By this theory, a student who studies hard for an exam is likely to explain her own (the actor's) intensive studying by referring to the upcoming difficult exam (a situational factor), whereas other people (the observers) are likely to explain her studying by referring to her dispositions, such as being hardworking or ambitious.

Early evidence

Soon after the publication of the actor–observer hypothesis, numerous research studies tested its validity, most notably the first such test in 1973 by Nisbett et al.^[14] The authors found initial evidence for the hypothesis,^[14] and so did Storms,^[15] who also examined one possible explanation of the hypothesis: actors explain their behaviors because they attend to the situation (not to their own behaviors) whereas observers attend to the actor's behavior (not to the situation). Based largely on this initial supporting evidence, the confidence in the hypothesis became uniformly high.^[16]

In the Nisbet et al. (1973) study, actor-observer asymmetry was tested by having participants select between two traits (such as energetic and relaxed), choosing which trait best matched the personality of the target, or if the trait that best matched them depended on the situation.^[17] They had participants chose between traits many times to see if participants mainly chose a specific trait or said it depended on the situation. Participants repeated the task saying what trait best matched for different people: their best friend, father, a famous news anchor, and themselves. The results showed that participants more frequently stated that the trait depended on the situation for themselves whereas for others' they often chose one trait that best described them. This provided evidence for actor-observer asymmetry because participants viewed other's personality traits as stable whereas their own as dependent on the situation.

Recent evidence and refutation

Over 100 studies have been published since 1971 in which the hypothesis was put to further tests (often in the context of testing another hypothesis about causal attributions). Bertram Malle examined this entire literature in a meta-analysis, finding that, across 170 individual tests, the asymmetry practically did not exist.^[11] The average effect sizes, computed in several accepted ways, ranged from d = -0.016 to d = 0.095; corrected for publication bias, the average effect size was 0. Under circumscribed conditions (i.e. if the actor was portrayed as highly idiosyncratic, or in negative events), it could sometimes be found, but under other conditions, the opposite was found. The conclusion was that the widely held assumption of an actor–observer asymmetry was false.

Cross Cultural Perspective

When analyzing actor-observer asymmetry cross-culturally, it is important to understand if there are differences in how cultures make attributions. If it is assumed that the attribution process is universal, then each culture should be equally prone to the actor-observer bias. However, a significant body of literature exists to support the idea that there are cross-cultural differences in the attribution process. Even when considering the fundamental attribution error, it has been extended to be known as the "ultimate attribution error" instead, for initially in its discovery it was assumed to be a universal, or a fundamental, phenomenon.^[18] It has since been demonstrated that Western cultures are more susceptible to making the fundamental attribution error in comparison to Eastern cultures.^[19] Today, the ultimate attribution error is understood to occur when members of an ingroup attribute negative behaviours of an outgroup to their disposition, while they attribute positive behaviours to situational factors. Accordingly, the opposite is true for when members of their own ingroup engage in positive or negative behaviours.^[18]

Returning to culture, it is widely understood that collectivist cultures lean towards making situational attributions for the behaviour of others, whereas individualistic cultures opt for dispositional attributions.^[20] More specifically, in an 1985 study by Cha & Nam, it was found that Korean individuals used more situationally-relevant information than Americans when making causal attributions.^[21] Notably, Choi & Nisbett conducted an experiment where participants witnessed an individual writing an essay maintaining a certain view, and both Americans and Koreans believed that the essay reflected the true views of the writer. However, when put in the same position and asked to write an essay about a particular topic themselves, only the Americans continued to believe that the essay was reflective of the writer's attitudes, whereas the Korean participants took into account the situational restraints, and acknowledged that the content of the essay may not truly represent the views held by the writer.^[21] Even in regards to interpreting one's own behaviour, individualistic cultures possess the tendency to make situational attributions for their own behaviours.^[22] This variation may arise out of one's need to protect their self-esteem or confidence, but also illustrates the differences in cognition and perception between actors and observers.^[22]

Understanding and acknowledging the cultural differences regarding attributional processes is necessary in discussions of the actor-observer effect. If individualistic, collectivist, Eastern, or Western cultures do not emphasize situational and dispositional factors in the same manner, then they are not all equally susceptible to the actor-observer asymmetry. At the same time, there is so much more cross-cultural variance that exists within the general categories of 'Eastern' and 'Western' cultures, which is why this perspective of this topic is deserving of significantly more attention and research.

Related concepts

Self-serving bias

The actor–observer asymmetry is often confused with the hypothesis of a self-serving bias in attribution — the claim that people choose explanations in a strategic way so as to make themselves appear in a more positive light.^[23] The difference between the two hypotheses is that the actor–observer asymmetry is expected to hold for all events and behaviors (whether they are positive or negative) and require a specific comparison between actor explanations and observer explanations. The self-serving bias is often formulated as a complete reversal in actors' and observers' explanation tendencies as a function of positive or negative events. For example, the self-serving bias holds that for positive events, actors will select explanations that refer to their own dispositions, (e.g., "I am smart"); however, for negative events, actors will select explanations that refer to the situation, (e.g., "the test was hard").

Positivity bias

The actor–observer asymmetry can seem similar to the hypothesis of a positivity bias^[24] in attribution — the claim that people are biased toward favorable evaluations. This hypothesis states that people will attribute their behavior with positive consequences to internal factors and their behavior with negative consequences to external factors.^[25]

Correspondence bias

Observers tend to attribute the actions of others to their future behavior. When someone witnesses another person's actions, they are likely to attribute those same actions to that person's future behavior, which is why first impressions are so important. Once an action is observed, it can be difficult for the observer to imagine the actor behaving differently. On the other hand, actors may find it difficult to attribute a single action to their overall behavior. They view themselves as more responsive and in control of situational matters. While actors can attribute their past actions, observers can only attribute the one action they have witnessed to the actor, leading them to attribute dispositional rather than situational factors to the actor's behavior.^[26]

See also

• Attribution (psychology)
• Fundamental attribution error
• List of biases in judgment and decision making
• Self-serving bias

References

1. Jones; Nisbett (1971). The actor and the observer: Divergent perceptions of the causes of behavior. New York: General Learning Press.
2. "6.2: Inferring Dispositions Using Causal Attribution". Social Sci LibreTexts. 2019-12-15. Retrieved 2024-11-23.
3. Malle 2006, pp. 895–919
4. Craighead; Nemeroff (2001). The Concise Corsini Encyclopedia of Psychology and Behavioral Science (3rd ed.). Wiley.
5. Craighead; Nemeroff (2001). The Concise Corsini Encyclopedia of Psychology and Behavioral Science (3rd ed.). Wiley.
6. McCornack Steven and Joseph Ortiz. Choices and connections 2nd edition, Bedford, 2016
7. Malle 2006.
8. "6.2: Inferring Dispositions Using Causal Attribution". Social Sci LibreTexts. 2019-12-15. Retrieved 2024-11-23.
9. Craighead; Nemeroff (2001). The Concise Corsini Encyclopedia of Psychology and Behavioral Science (3rd ed.). Wiley.
10. Jones; Nisbett (1971). The actor and the observer: Divergent perceptions of the causes of behavior. New York: General Learning Press.
11. Malle 2006, pp. 895–919
12. See Malle et al. 2007 for relevant references.
13. Heider, F (1958). he psychology of interpersonal relations. Lawrence Erlbaum.
14. Nisbett, Richard E.; Caputo, Craig; Legant, Patricia; Marecek, Jeanne (1973). "Behavior as seen by the actor and as seen by the observer". Journal of Personality and Social Psychology. 27 (2): 154–164. doi:10.1037/h0034779. ISSN 1939-1315.
15. Storms, Michael D. (1973). "Videotape and the attribution process: Reversing actors' and observers' points of view". Journal of Personality and Social Psychology. 27 (2): 165–175. doi:10.1037/h0034782. ISSN 1939-1315. PMID 4723963.
16. Jones, Edward E. (1976). "How Do People Perceive the Causes of Behavior? Experiments based on attribution theory offer some insights into how actors and observers differ in viewing the causal structure of their social world". American Scientist. 64 (3): 300–305. JSTOR 27847255.
17. "6.2: Inferring Dispositions Using Causal Attribution". Social Sci LibreTexts. 2019-12-15. Retrieved 2024-11-23.
18. Pettigrew, Thomas Fraser (October 1979). "The Ultimate Attribution Error: Extending Allport's Cognitive Analysis of Prejudice". Personality and Social Psychology Bulletin. 5 (4): 461–476 – via Research Gate.
19. Krull, Douglas S.; Loy, Michelle Hui-Min; Lin, Jennifer; Wang, Ching-Fu; Chen, Suhong; Zhao, Xudong (1999-10-01). "The Fundamental Fundamental Attribution Error: Correspondence Bias in Individualist and Collectivist Cultures". Personality and Social Psychology Bulletin. 25 (10): 1208–1219. doi:10.1177/0146167299258003. ISSN 0146-1672.
20. Menon, Tanya; Morris, Michael W.; Chiu, Chi-yue; Hong, Ying-yi (1999). "Culture and the construal of agency: Attribution to individual versus group dispositions". Journal of Personality and Social Psychology. 76 (5): 701–717. doi:10.1037/0022-3514.76.5.701.
21. Krull, Douglas S.; Loy, Michelle Hui-Min; Lin, Jennifer; Wang, Ching-Fu; Chen, Suhong; Zhao, Xudong (1999-10-01). "The Fundamental Fundamental Attribution Error: Correspondence Bias in Individualist and Collectivist Cultures". Personality and Social Psychology Bulletin. 25 (10): 1208–1219. doi:10.1177/0146167299258003. ISSN 0146-1672.
22. "W. W. Norton & Company | Psychology 7 ed". wwnorton.com. Retrieved 2024-11-30.
23. Myers, David G. (2015). Exploring social psychology (7th ed.). New York: McGraw-Hill Education. ISBN 978-0-07-782545-4.
24. Hoorens, Vera (2014). "Positivity Bias". Encyclopedia of Quality of Life and Well-Being Research. pp. 4938–4941. doi:10.1007/978-94-007-0753-5_2219. ISBN 978-94-007-0752-8.
25. Van der Pligt, Joop (1983). "Actors' and Observers' attributions, self-serving bias and positivity bias" (PDF). European Journal of Social Psychology. 13 (1): 95–104. doi:10.1002/ejsp.2420130107. hdl:11245/1.422061.
26. Gilbert, Daniel; Malone, Patrick (1995). "The correspondence bias". Psychological Bulletin. 117 (1): 21–38. doi:10.1037/0033-2909.117.1.21. PMID 7870861. S2CID 4798660.

Bibliography

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• Jones, Edward; Nisbett, Richard (1971). The actor and the observer: Divergent perceptions of the causes of behavior. New York: General Learning Press.
  • Also available in: Jones, Edward E. (1972). Attribution: perceiving the causes of behavior. Morristown, N.J.: General Learning Press. ISBN 978-0-382-25026-2. OCLC 516505.
• Chen, Chenyi; Martínez, Róger; Chen, Yijhen; Chen, Yawei (2020). "Pointing fingers at others: The neural correlates of actor-observer asymmetry in blame attribution". Neuropsychologia. 136. doi:10.1016/j.neuropsychologia.2019.107281. PMID 31770551.
• Malle, Bertram (2004). How the Mind Explains Behavior: Folk Explanations, Meaning, and Social Interaction. MIT Press. ISBN 9780262134453.
• Malle, Bertram (2006). "The actor-observer asymmetry in causal attribution: A (surprising) meta-analysis". Psychological Bulletin. 132 (6): 895–919. doi:10.1037/0033-2909.132.6.895. PMID 17073526. S2CID 12065432.
• Malle, Bertram F.; Knobe, Joshua M.; Nelson, Sarah E. (2007). "Actor-observer asymmetries in explanations of behavior: New answers to an old question". Journal of Personality and Social Psychology. 93 (4): 491–514. doi:10.1037/0022-3514.93.4.491. PMID 17892328.
• Nisbett, Richard E.; Caputo, Craig; Legant, Patricia; Marecek, Jeanne (August 1973). "Behavior as seen by the actor and as seen by the observer". Journal of Personality and Social Psychology. 27 (2): 154–164. doi:10.1037/h0034779.
• Storms, Michael (1973). "Videotape and the attribution process: Reversing actors' and observers' points of view". Journal of Personality and Social Psychology. 27 (2): 165–175. doi:10.1037/h0034782. PMID 4723963. S2CID 17120868.