Boyd became interested in the philosophy of science during his undergraduate studies for a mathematics major at MIT for which he was awarded an S.B. in 1963.[8][5] He then, at the same institution and under the directorship of Richard Cartwright, went on to earn his Ph.D in 1970 with a doctoral thesis on mathematical logic titled A Recursion-Theoretic Characterization of the Ramified Analytical Hierarchy.[9] (He would also co-author, with Gustav Hensel and Hilary Putnam, a 1969 paper by this title.[10])
In the case of scientific realism, Boyd was a defender of what is called "the miracle argument" according to which if successful scientific theories "were far from the truth...the fact that they are so successful would be miraculous. And given the choice between a straightforward explanation of success and a miraculous explanation, clearly one should prefer the non-miraculous explanation, viz. that our best theories are approximately true."[14]
In the case of moral realism, he was a key figure in the meta-ethical school known as "Cornell Realism." On this view, a moral property like "goodness is a complex natural property that is not directly observable, but nonetheless has a robust causal profile.... 'Goodness' is not synonymous with any simpler set of more directly observable claims. Instead, 'goodness' describes the functionally complex natural property that is the effect of certain characteristic causes, and the cause of certain characteristic effects."
[15]
Boyd, along with Hilary Putnam and Jerry Fodor, was also influential in the development of an anti-reductionist form of materialism in the philosophy of mind. In this view, although all individual psychological states and processes are entirely constituted by physical entities, the "explanations, natural kinds, and properties in psychology do not reduce to counterparts in more basic sciences, such as neurophysiology or physics."[16]
^ ab"Richard Newell Boyd | Sage School of Philosophy Cornell Arts & Sciences". philosophy.cornell.edu. Retrieved 2021-02-23. Professor Boyd specializes in philosophy of science, epistemology, philosophy of language, and philosophy of mind. He is also interested in ethics, in social and political philosophy, especially Marxism, and in the philosophy of biology. He came to the Sage School faculty in 1972, after teaching at Harvard, the University of Michigan, and the University of California at Berkeley.
^ ab"William F. Podlich Distinguished Fellows". cmc.edu. Retrieved 2021-02-24. Richard N. Boyd [...] is well known for his work in philosophy of science, philosophy of mind, and ethics -- particularly on moral realism. Boyd became interested in the philosophy of science while an undergraduate mathematics major at MIT, where he later earned a Ph.D. in philosophy with a dissertation in mathematical logic. His original interests in foundational issues in philosophy of science have expanded to include interests in metaphysics (especially the metaphysics of kinds and categories - like biological species and chemical compounds - and of causation), in epistemology (especially in competing notions of rationality and objectivity), in philosophy of biology (especially in issues about the foundations of biological taxonomy and about methods in sociobiology), in philosophy of mind and language and in the foundations of ethics.
^cgraham. "Dissertations". MIT Philosophy. Retrieved 2021-02-23.
^"Philosophy". The University of Canterbury. Retrieved 2021-02-24.
^"Ethics in Science". uh.edu. 2012. Retrieved 2021-02-23. Richard Boyd is Susan Linn Sage Professor of Philosophy and Professor of Science and Technology Studies at Cornell University. He did his undergraduate work (mathematics) and graduate work (philosophy) at MIT. He has held teaching appointments at The University of Michigan, The University of California Berkeley, Harvard, MIT, The University of Canterbury (NZ), The University of Melbourne, and Claremont-McKenna College. He works on issues in philosophy of science, the philosophy of biology, the philosophy of mind, and metaethics.
^Radcliffe, Elizabeth S. (2015-04-01). "Moral and scientific realism: essays in honor of Richard N. Boyd and Nicholas L. Sturgeon". Philosophical Studies. 172 (4): 841. doi:10.1007/s11098-014-0302-3. ISSN1573-0883. Boyd and Sturgeon are closely identified with the metaethical view known as "Cornell realism," a theory both philosophers have articulated, developed and defended throughout their careers. Boyd's and Sturgeon's moral realism involves a commitment to objective, mind-independent facts about morality. Moral facts are natural facts, but irreducible to non-moral natural facts. Boyd is also a prominent defender of scientific realism, the view that scientific theories yield knowledge of the world, including of the unobservables the theories concern. Both Boyd and Sturgeon have related interests in evolutionary biology and its implications for ethics.
^Chakravartty, Anjan (2017). "Scientific Realism". In Zalta, Edward N. (ed.). The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy (Summer 2017 ed.). Metaphysics Research Lab, Stanford University. § 2.1 The Miracle Argument. Retrieved 2021-02-23.
^Lutz, Matthew; Lenman, James (2021). "Moral Naturalism". In Zalta, Edward N. (ed.). The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy (Spring 2021 ed.). Metaphysics Research Lab, Stanford University. § 3.2 Cornell Realism. Retrieved 2021-02-23.