Does Title VII prohibit discrimination in transfer decisions absent a separate court determination that the transfer decision caused a significant disadvantage?
Holding
Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 protects against discriminatory job transfers even where the transfer does not result in a significant disadvantage.
Kagan, joined by Roberts, Sotomayor, Gorsuch, Barrett, Jackson
Concurrence
Thomas (in judgment)
Concurrence
Alito (in judgment)
Concurrence
Kavanaugh (in judgment)
Muldrow v. City of St. Louis (Docket 22-193) was a United States Supreme Court decision which held that Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 protects against discriminatory job transfers even where the transfer does not result in a significant disadvantage.
Among several provisions in the law is Title VII, which covers equal employment opportunities. Its key provision, codified at 42 U.S.C.§ 2000e-2(a)(1), states that it is illegal to discriminate "with respect to his compensation, terms, conditions, or privileges of employment because of such individual's race, color, religion, sex, or national origin."
In employment discrimination cases where the only evidence of discrimination is indirect, courts evaluate the claim under the McDonnell Douglas burden-shifting framework. To have an actionable claim under Title VII, and other employment discrimination statutes, the plaintiff must make out a prima facie (on its face) case of discrimination. This requires a plaintiff to show "(1) she is a member of a protected group; (2) she was subjected to an adverse employment decision; (3) she was qualified for the position; and (4) she was replaced by a person outside the protected class, or similarly situated non-protected employees were treated more favorably."[2] If the plaintiff can meet these factors, they have shown an inference of discrimination, which the employer can rebut.
By the mid 1990s, plaintiffs were expected to prove that the discriminatory employment action was "materially adverse" to qualify for Title VII protections, a standard which was interpreted to exclude lateral transfers, in which one retains similar pay and benefits while shifted into a different position.[3][4]
Under the Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit's "ultimate employment decision" standard, plaintiffs could only bring Title VII claims in cases of discriminatory hiring, firing, compensation, and/or placement on leave.[5] In 2017, the District Court for Western Louisiana applied this standard to deny Title VII protections to an employee alleging racial and religious discrimination in punishments for lateness and access to air conditioning.[6]
Jatonya Clayborn Muldrow is a sergeant with the St. Louis Police Department. From 2008 to 2017, she worked in the Department's Intelligence Division. In 2017, the Intelligence Division's new commander transferred Muldrow into the department's Fifth District, which had the same pay and title but changed her schedule, overtime opportunities, prestige, and comfort of work clothing (she previously could wear plainclothes but now had to wear a uniform, duty belt, and vest). Muldrow's replacement at the Intelligence Division was a man. Muldrow was then denied a transfer to become the administrative aide to the Captain in the Department's Second District. Muldrow was eventually transferred back to the Intelligence Division.
On August 29, 2022, Muldrow petitioned the Supreme Court to hear her case. On June 30, 2023, the court granted certiorari.[13] The case was argued on December 6, 2023.[14] On behalf of Ms. Muldrow, the case was argued by Brian Wolfman, Director of the Georgetown Law Appellate Courts Immersion Clinic, who split the argument time with Deputy Solicitor General Aimee Brown.[15] Robert Loeb, a partner at Orrick, Herrington & Sutcliffe argued the case for St. Louis Police Department.[16]
During oral argument, a majority of the justices seemed to lean towards Ms. Muldrow's argument.[17] On April 24, 2024, the Supreme court vacated the Eighth circuit's decision.[18]
