The Congress was important in establishing the principle of party control over the military, which continues to be a core principle of the ideology of the Chinese Communist Party.
Conference
On behalf of the Central Committee in September 1929, Zhou Enlai wrote a letter to the 4th Red Army affirming Mao Zedong's view of an armed division composed of workers and peasants.[2]: 178 The letter emphasized the principle, "First is the Red Army, and later urban political power. This is characteristic of the Chinese revolution, which is a product of China's economic foundation."[2]: 178 It described the Red Army's basic tasks as "1) mobilizing mass struggle, implementing the agrarian revolution, and establishing the soviet regime, 2) implementing guerilla warfare, arming the peasants, expanding its own organization, and 3) expanding the guerilla's territory and political influence throughout the entire country."[2]: 304
Acting on this letter, in December 1929 the 4th Army of the Chinese Workers' and Peasants' Red Army held its 9th Party Congress at Gutian.[2]: 178
Most of the delegates to this congress were army men. Mao, voted out six months earlier but moving from his success at the Jiaoyang Congress (also in Shanghang), addressed the Zhu-Mao 4th Army (朱毛四军) as its Comintern-anointed political commissar and chaired the congress. Mao emphasized the importance of a politically and ideologically-aligned military to the success of the Communist Party.[1] Mao stated that the Red Army was "an armed group that carries out the political work of the revolution" and that "[i]n addition to fighting to destroy the enemy's power, it must also bear the burden of propagating, organizing, and arming the masses and helping them establish revolutionary regimes and even build the Communist Party."[2]: 304–305 According to Mao, "This is the whole purpose behind winning the war, and the very purpose for which the army exists."[2]: 305
The Resolution adopted following the Congress (the Gutian Congress Resolution or 古田会议决议) also emphasized the connection between war and politics, including the class nature of war.[2]: 289 According to the Resolution, the Party's leading organs in the army must become "the central leadership" and that all major issues discussed at Party Committee meetings must be "resolutely implemented".[2]: 307 The Resolution stated that the Red Army must be organized democratically.[2]: 321 The Resolution also called for the criticism of what was seen as excessive democratic deliberation and discussion in the fighting force ("ultra-democracy"), preferring democratic centralism whereby the minority agreed to abide by the decisions of the majority, lower levels unquestioningly implemented decisions made by the leadership, and that mistaken ideas must be "corrected through ideological criticism."[3][2]: 400, 410 Mao drafted the Resolution.[2]: 307
Legacy
The Congress was important in establishing the principle of party control over the military, which continues to be a core principle of the ideology of the Chinese Communist Party.[1] In the short term, this concept was further developed in the June 1930 Program for the Red Fourth Army at All Levels and the winter 1930 Provisional Regulations on the Political Work of the Chinese Workers and Peasants Army (Draft), which formally established Party leadership of the military.[2]: 307
The principles in the Guitan Congress Resolution were part of the development of the mass line.[2]: 366
One of the selections from the Gutian Congress Resolution later included in Mao's Little Red Book is as follows:
In the sphere of theory, destroy the roots of ultra-democracy. First, it should be pointed out that the danger of ultra-democracy lies in the fact that it damages or even completely wrecks the Party organisation and weakens or even completely undermines the Party's fighting capacity, rendering the Party incapable of fulfilling its fighting tasks and thereby causing the defeat of the revolution. Next it should be pointed out that the source of ultra-democracy consists in the petty bourgeoisie's individualistic aversion to discipline. When this characteristic is brought into the Party, it develops into ultra-democratic ideas politically and organisationally. These ideas are utterly incompatible with the fighting tasks of the proletariat.
In 2014, Xi Jinping convened a Military Political Work Conference with 420 military officials at Gutian in order to emphasize the principles established at the 1929 Gutian Congress.[1]: 279–280 Xi reaffirmed the principle that "the Party commands the Gun" and highlighted the significance of political work in military development.[1]: 280
^ abcdeDuan, Lei (2024). "Towards a More Joint Strategy: Assessing Chinese Military Reforms and Militia Reconstruction". In Fang, Qiang; Li, Xiaobing (eds.). China under Xi Jinping: A New Assessment. Leiden University Press. p. 280. ISBN9789087284411.
^ abcdefghijklmHuang, Yibing (2020). An Ideological History of the Communist Party of China. Vol. 1. Qian Zheng, Guoyou Wu, Xuemei Ding, Li Sun, Shelly Bryant. Montreal, Quebec: Royal Collins. ISBN978-1-4878-0425-1. OCLC1165409653.
