Compulsory cartel

A compulsory cartel or forced cartel is a cartel that is established or maintained by an administrative order or by a legal directive. The interference of policies on these associations of entrepreneurs of the same trade varied. It ranged from a mere decision to establish a cartel or to maintain an existing one, to a strict state control.^[1]

Disagreement over the nature of compulsory cartels

The understanding of “compulsory cartels” as “cartels” has always been disputed.^[2] While the older cartel experts before the 1930s usually insisted in the free entrepreneurial will that constituted a “cartel”, later authors were more tolerant and accepted forced cartels as an exception. In recent times (2007), the economic-historian Jeffrey R. Fear took this stance of the “exception to the rule” that would not contradict the general nature of these organizations.^[3] The cartel-historian Holm Arno Leonhardt has positioned himself more differentiated in 2013: Forced cartels that were embedded in a totalitarian planning economy or were by other means unable to realize their own will, should be regarded as organs or appendages of another system.^[4] Thus, “compulsory cartels” without a permanent political influence could indeed constitute real “cartels”, while others being under strict control acted mainly as servants of an alien will.

Examples

• German potash syndicate:^[5] This was since 1919 a public-law body and was integrated into a control structure with its customers, laborers, traders and instances of administration.
• Japanese steel cartel of the 1930s.^[6]
• Rhenish-Westphalian Coal Syndicate, Northwest Germany:^[7] This too was since 1919 a public body and integrated into a similar control structure as the German potash syndicate.
• Russian sugar syndicate of the 1890s.^{[citation needed]}

See also

• Coercive monopoly
• Government-granted monopoly

Bibliography

• Fear, Jeffrey R.: Cartels. In: Geoffrey Jones; Jonathan Zeitlin (ed.): The Oxford handbook of business history. Oxford: Univ. Press, 2007, p. 268-293.
• Leonhardt, Holm Arno: Kartelltheorie und Internationale Beziehungen. Theoriegeschichtliche Studien, Hildesheim 2013.
• Korrell, Emil: Zwangskartelle als Mittel gegen ruinöse Konkurrenz. Forchheim 1937.
• Liefmann, Robert: Cartels, Concerns and Trusts, Ontario 2001 [London 1932]

References

1. Holm A. Leonhardt: Kartelltheorie und Internationale Beziehungen. Theoriegeschichtliche Studien, Hildesheim 2013, p. 144-145.
2. Holm A. Leonhardt: Kartelltheorie und Internationale Beziehungen. Theoriegeschichtliche Studien, Hildesheim 2013, p. 146-155.
3. Jeffrey R. Fear: Cartels. In: Geoffrey Jones; Jonathan Zeitlin (ed.): The Oxford handbook of business history. Oxford: Univ. Press, 2007, p. 271.
4. Holm A. Leonhardt: Kartelltheorie und Internationale Beziehungen. Theoriegeschichtliche Studien, Hildesheim 2013, p. 164-165.
5. Liefmann, Robert: Cartels, Concerns and Trusts, Ontario 2001 [London 1932], p. 267.
6. Hausleiter, Leo (1932): Revolution der Weltwirtschaft. München, p. 200.
7. Liefmann, Robert: Cartels, Concerns and Trusts, Ontario 2001 [London 1932], p. 268.