Bourguibism is defined by a strong commitment to national independence and specifically Tunisian nationalism (as opposed to pan-Maghrebi or pan-Arab ideas),[1][2] a state capitalist approach on economic development,[3][4]welfare state,[5] a statist and corporatist interpretation of populism,[6] strict secularism,[7] and cultural modernity, advocating Tunisia's place as a bridge between Arab-Islamic and Western civilisation.[8] Bourguibism is responsible for Tunisia's comparatively high divorce rates[citation needed], which is one of the highest in the Arab and Islamic world, and relatively late age for women to get married (the average age for a woman is 35 years, which is much higher compared to most other Arab countries[which?]). Tunisian women are more sexually liberated, unlike their neighboring countries, and have a relatively strong role in economy, society and labour (all of which are comparable to the West).[9][10] While Bourguibists condemned Tunisians who had collaborated with the French colonial rulers,[11] they did not repress the strong European cultural influence on Tunisia and French continued to be the language of higher education and elite culture.[12] Bourguibism is sometimes described as a variety of Kemalism but with focus on the Tunisian identity.[13]
As a political style or strategy, Bourguibism is characterised by intransigence in pursuing certain goals and non-negotiable principles combined with flexibility in negotiations and readiness to compromise considering the means to effectuate them.[14] It is therefore described as pragmatic, non-ideological, moderate, and reformist rather than revolutionary, but determined and relentless at the same time.[15][16] For example, despite being decidedly secularist, Bourguiba made sure to curtail the public role of Islam only carefully and gradually, in order not to arouse opposition from conservative Muslims.[12]
Brown, L. Carl (2001). "Bourguiba and Bourguibism Revisited: Reflections and Interpretation". Middle East Journal. 55 (1): 43–57.
References
^Alexander, Christopher (2010). Tunisia: Stability and Reform in the Modern Maghreb. Routledge. pp. 100–101.
^Hudson, Michael C. (1977). Arab Politics: The Search for Legitimacy. Yale University Press. p. 385.
^Alexander, Christopher (2010). Tunisia: Stability and Reform in the Modern Maghreb. Routledge. pp. 7, 112.
^Ayubi, Nazih N. (2009). Over-stating the Arab State: Politics and Society in the Middle East. I.B. Tauris. p. 212.
^Cassarino, Jean-Pierre (2004). Participatory Development and Liberal Reforms in Tunisia: The Gradual Incorporation of Some Economic Networks. Palgrave Macmillan. p. 229. {{cite book}}: |work= ignored (help)
^Podeh, Elie; Winckler, Onn. Introduction: Nasserism as a Form of Populism. p. 27. {{cite book}}: |work= ignored (help)
^Hudson, Michael C. (1977). Arab Politics: The Search for Legitimacy. Yale University Press. pp. 380–381.
^Voll, John Obert (1994). Islam: Continuity and Change in the Modern World (Second ed.). Syracuse University Press. p. 331.
^Sorenson, David S. (2014). An Introduction to the Modern Middle East: History, Religion, Political Economy, Politics (Second ed.). Westview Press. p. 383.
^Browers, Michaelle L. (2006). Democracy and Civil Society in Arab Political Thought: Transcultural Possibilities. Syracuse University Press. p. 173.
^Angrist, Michele Penner (2006). Party Building in the Modern Middle East. University of Washington Press. p. 112.
^ abEsposito, John L.; Voll, John O. (2001). Makers of Contemporary Islam. Oxford University Press. p. 92.
